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Abstract
Bielecki and Rutkowski [2] introduced and studied a generic nonlinear market model, which
includes several risky assets, multiple funding accounts and margin accounts. In this paper, we
examine the pricing and hedging of contract both from the perspective of the hedger and the
counterparty with arbitrary initial endowments. We derive inequalities for unilateral prices and
we give the range for either fair bilateral prices or bilaterally profitable prices. We also study
the monotonicity of a unilateral price with respect to the initial endowment. Our study hinges
on results for BSDE driven by continuous martingales obtained in [14], but we also derive
the pricing PDEs for path-independent contingent claims of European style in a Markovian
framework.
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1 Introduction
In Bielecki and Rutkowski [2], the authors introduced a generic nonlinear trading model for bilateral
collateralized contracts, which includes several risky assets, multiple funding accounts, as well as
the margin account. For related recent studies by other authors, see also [3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 19].
Using a suitable version of the no-arbitrage argument, they first discussed the hedger’s fair price
for a contract in the market model without collateralization (see Section 3.2 in [2]). Subsequently,
for a collateralized contract that can be replicated, they defined the hedger’s ex-dividend price (see
Section 5 in [2]). It was also shown in [2] that the theory of backward stochastic differential equations
(BSDEs) is an important tool to compute the ex-dividend price (see, e.g., Propositions 5.2 and 5.4
in [2]). It is worth mentioning that all the pricing and hedging arguments in [2] are given from the
viewpoint of the hedger and no attempt was made there to derive no-arbitrage bounds for unilateral
prices and to examine the existence of fair bilateral prices. In the present work, we consistently
examine the issue of pricing and hedging of an OTC derivative contract from the perspective of the
hedger and his counterparty. Since we work within a nonlinear trading set-up, where the nonlinearity
may stem from the different cash interest rates, funding costs for risky assets and collateralization,
the hedger’s and counterparty’s price do not necessarily coincide. Therefore, our goal is to compare
the hedger’s and counterparty’s prices and to derive the range for no-arbitrage prices. In the case
of different lending and borrowing rates, which is a relatively simple instance of a nonlinear market
model, the no-arbitrage price of any contingent claims must belong to an arbitrage band with the
lower (resp., upper) bound given by the counterparty’s (resp., the hedger’s) price of the contract
(see Bergman [1]). In a recent paper by Mercurio [13], the author extended the results from [1] by
examining the pricing of European options in a model with different lending and borrowing interest
rates and under collateralization.
As emphasized in [2], in the nonlinear setup (for instance, in a market model with different
borrowing and lending interest rates), the initial endowments of the hedger and the counterparty
play an important role in pricing considerations. Unlike in the classic options pricing model, which
enjoys the linearity of the no-arbitrage pricing rule, it is no longer true that it suffices to consider
the case where the initial endowments are null. This is due to the fact that, for instance, the
hedger’s ex-dividend price may depend on his initial endowment, in general (see Proposition 5.2 in
[2]). Note in this regard that the results established in [1] and [13] only cover the case when the
initial endowments of the hedger and the counterparty are null. In this paper, one of our main goals
is to examine how the initial endowment of each party affects his unilateral price. For the sake of
concreteness, we consider the model with partial netting and collateralization which was introduced
in [2]. A similar analysis was also done for the model previously studied by Bergman [1], but with
non-zero initial endowments of counterparties (see Nie and Rutkowski [15]). It is clear that the
method developed in these papers can be applied to other set-ups.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview the set-up studied in [2]
and we describe the main model considered in the foregoing sections, dubbed the market model with
partial netting. In Section 3, we present definitions of no-arbitrage and fair prices, as introduced
in [2]. Some preliminary results from [2] are extended to the case of a collateralized contract with
an exogenous margin account and we introduce and discuss the concepts of fair bilateral prices
and bilaterally profitable prices. In Section 4, we show that the pricing and hedging problems for
both parties can be represented by solutions of some BSDEs and we establish the existence and
uniqueness results for these BSDEs. Although the BSDEs are well known to be a convenient tool
to deal with prices and hedging strategies (see, e.g., [7, 8, 11]), we stress that the BSDEs studied in
this work are formally derived using no-arbitrage arguments under a judiciously chosen martingale
measure, whereas in some other papers on funding costs the existence of a ‘risk-neutral probability’
is postulated a priori, rather than formally justified. Section 5, which is the main part of this work,
deals with the properties of unilateral prices. Under alternative assumptions on initial endowments
of both parties, we establish several inequalities for unilateral prices, which in turn allow us to obtain
the ranges for fair bilateral prices or bilaterally profitable prices. We also examine the monotonicity
of prices with respect to initial endowment and we present the PDE approach within a Markovian
framework. Lengthy proofs of some results are gathered in the appendix.
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2 Trading under Funding Costs and Collateralization
Let us first recall the following setting of [2] for the market models. Throughout the paper, we fix
a finite trading horizon date T > 0 for our model of the financial market. Let (Ω,G,G,P) be a
filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness, where
the filtration G = (Gt)t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For convenience,
we assume that the initial σ-field G0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows
are implicitly assumed to be G-adapted and any semimartingale is assumed to be ca`dla`g.
Risky assets. For i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we denote by Si the ex-dividend price of the ith risky asset with
the cumulative dividend stream Ai. Si is aimed to represent the price of any traded security, such
as, stock, stock option, interest rate swap, currency option, cross-currency swap, CDS, CDO, etc.
Cash accounts. The riskless lending (resp., borrowing) cash account Bl (resp., Bb) is used for
unsecured lending (resp., borrowing) of cash. When the borrowing and lending cash rates are equal,
we denote the cash account simply by B0.
Funding accounts. We denote by Bi,l (resp., Bi,b) the lending (resp., borrowing) funding account
associated with the ith risky asset. In case when borrowing and lending rates are equal, we simply
denote by Bi the funding account for the ith risky asset. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we work
under the assumption: long and short funding rates for each risky asset Si are identical, that is,
Bi,l = Bi,b = Bi for i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
Assumption 2.1 The price processes of primary assets are assumed to satisfy:
(i) For each i = 1, 2, . . . , d, the price Si is semimartingale and the cumulative dividend stream Ai is
finite variation process with Ai0 = 0.
(ii) The riskless account Bl, Bb and Bi are strictly positive and continuous finite variation processes
with Bl0 = B
b
0 = B
i
0 = 1, for i = 1, 2 . . . , d.
For a bilateral financial contract, or simply a contract, we mean an arbitrary ca`dla`g process A of
finite variation. The process A is aimed to represent the cumulative cash flows of a given contract
from time 0 till its maturity date T . By convention, we set A0− = 0.
The process A is assumed to model all cash flows of a given contract, which are either paid out
from the wealth or added to the wealth, as seen from the perspective of the hedger (recall that the
other party is referred to as the counterparty). Note that the process A includes the initial cash flow
A0 of a contract at its inception date t0 = 0. For instance, if a contract has the initial price p and
stipulates that the hedger will receive cash flows A¯1, A¯2, . . . , A¯k at times t1, t2, . . . , tk ∈ (0, T ], then
we set A0 = p so that
At = p+
k∑
l=1
1[tl,T ](t)A¯l.
The symbol p is frequently used to emphasize that all future cash flows A¯l for l = 1, 2, . . . , k are
explicitly specified by the contract’s covenants, but the initial cash flow A0 is yet to be formally
defined and evaluated. Valuation of a contract A means, in particular, searching for the range
of fair values p at time 0 from the viewpoint of either the hedger or the counterparty. Although
the valuation paradigm will be the same for the two parties, due either to the asymmetry in their
trading costs and opportunities, or the non-linearity of the wealth dynamics, they will typically
obtain different sets of fair prices for A. This is the main objective of our current work.
2.1 Collateralization
In this paper, we examine the situation when the hedger and the counterparty enter a contract and
either receive or post collateral with the value formally represented by a stochastic process C, which
is assumed to be a semimartingale (or, at least, a ca`dla`g process). The process C is called the margin
account or the collateral amount. Let
Ct = Ct1{Ct≥0} + Ct1{Ct<0} = C
+
t − C
−
t . (2.1)
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By convention, C+t is the cash value of collateral received at time t by the hedger, whereas C
−
t
represents the cash value of collateral posted by him. For simplicity of presentation, it is postulated
throughout that only cash collateral may be delivered or received (for other conventions, see [2]).
We also make the following natural assumption regarding the state of the margin account at the
contract’s maturity date.
Assumption 2.2 The G-adapted collateral amount process C satisfies CT = 0.
The equality CT = 0 is a convenient way of ensuring that any collateral amount posted is returned
in full to its owner when a contract matures, provided that the default event does not occur at T .
Of course, if the default event is also modeled, then one needs to specify the closeout payoff.
Let us first make some comments from the perspective of the hedger regarding the crucial features
of the margin accounts. The current financial practice typically requires the collateral amounts to
be held in segregated margin accounts, so that the hedger, when he is a collateral taker, cannot make
use of the collateral amount for trading. Another collateral convention encountered in practice is
rehypothecation, which refers to the situation where a bank is allowed to reuse the collateral pledged
by its counterparties as collateral for its own borrowing. Note that if the hedger is a collateral giver,
then a particular convention regarding segregation or rehypothecation is immaterial for the wealth
dynamics of his portfolio.
We are in a position to introduce trading strategies based on a finite family of primary assets.
Remark 2.1 For simplicity, we discuss from the point view of hedger, unless explicitly stated. The
similar discussions hold for the counterparty by changing (A,C) to (−A,−C).
Definition 2.1 A collateralized hedger’s trading strategy is a quadruplet (x, ϕ,A,C) where a port-
folio ϕ, given by
ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1, . . . , ψd+1, ηb, ηl, ηd+2
)
(2.2)
is composed of the risky assets Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d, the unsecured lending cash accountBl the unsecured
borrowing cash account Bb, the funding accounts Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , d, the borrowing account Bd+1 for
the posted cash collateral, the collateral accounts Bc,b and Bc,l, and the lending account Bd+2
associated with the received cash collateral.
If Bc,b 6= Bc,l, for example if the hedger post the collateral, he will receives interest from the
counterparty determined by Bc,l, i.e., the counterparty pays the hedger the interest determined
by Bc,l not Bc,b. This creates the non-identical financial environment between the hedger and
counterparty. We make the following standing assumption.
Assumption 2.3 The collateral accounts Bc,l, Bc,b, Bd+1, Bd+2 are strictly positive, continuous
processes of finite variation with Bc,l0 = B
c,b
0 = B
d+1
0 = B
d+2
0 = 1.
Remark 2.2 The cash collateral is described by the following postulates:
(i) If the hedger receives at time t the amount C+t as cash collateral, then he pays to the counter-
party interest determined by the amount C+t and the account B
c,b. Under segregation, he receives
interest determined by the amount C+t and the account B
d+2 and thus ηd+2t B
d+2
t = C
+
t . When
rehypothecation is considered, the hedger may temporarily (that is, before the contract’s maturity
date or the default time, whichever comes first) utilize the cash amount C+t for his trading purposes,
then ηd+2 = 0.
(ii) If the hedger posts a cash collateral at time t, then the collateral amount is borrowed from the
dedicated collateral borrowing account Bd+1. He receives interest determined by the amount C−t
and the collateral account Bc,l. We postulate that
ψd+1t B
d+1
t = −C
−
t . (2.3)
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2.2 Self-Financing Trading Strategies
In the context of a collateralized contract, we find it convenient to introduce the following three
processes:
(i) the process Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) representing the hedger’s wealth at time t,
(ii) the process V pt (x, ϕ,A,C) representing the value of hedger’s portfolio at time t,
(iii) the adjustment process V Ct (x, ϕ,A,C) := Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) − V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C), which is aimed to
quantify the impact of the margin account on trading strategy.
Definition 2.2 The hedger’s portfolio’s value V p(x, ϕ,A,C) is given by
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) =
d∑
i=1
ξitS
i
t +
d+1∑
j=1
ψ
j
tB
j
t + ψ
l
tB
l
t + ψ
b
tB
b
t . (2.4)
The hedger’s wealth V (x, ϕ,A,C) equals
Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) =
d∑
i=1
ξitS
i
t +
d+1∑
j=1
ψ
j
tB
j
t + ψ
l
tB
l
t + ψ
b
tB
b
t + η
b
tB
c,b
t + η
l
tB
c,l
t + η
d+2
t B
d+2
t . (2.5)
It is clear that the adjustment process V C(x, ϕ,A,C) equals
V Ct (x, ϕ,A,C) = η
b
tB
c,b
t + η
l
tB
c,l
t + η
d+2
t B
d+2
t = −Ct + η
d+2
t B
d+2
t (2.6)
where ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t and η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t .
The self-financing property of the hedger’s strategy is defined in terms of the dynamics of the
value process. Note that we use here the process V p(x, ϕ,A,C), and not V (x, ϕ,A,C), to emphasize
the role of V p(x, ϕ,A,C) as the value of the hedger’s portfolio of traded assets. Observe also that
the equality V p(x, ϕ,A,C) = V (x, ϕ,A,C) holds when the process C vanishes, that is, C = 0, since
then ηd+2 = 0 as well. Let x stand for the initial endowment of the hedger.
Definition 2.3 A collateralized hedger’s trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) with ϕ given by (2.2) is self-
financing whenever the portfolio’s value V p(x, ϕ,A,C), which is given by (2.4), satisfies, for every
t ∈ [0, T ],
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) = x+
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,t]
ξiu d(S
i
u +A
i
u) +
d+1∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ψju dB
j
u +
∫ t
0
ψlu dB
l
u +
∫ t
0
ψbu dB
b
u +At
(2.7)
+
∫ t
0
ηbu dB
c,b
u +
∫ t
0
ηlu dB
c,l
u +
∫ t
0
ηd+2u dB
d+2
u − V
C
t (x, ϕ,A,C).
The terms
∫ t
0 η
b
u dB
c,b
u ,
∫ t
0 η
l
u dB
c,l
u and
∫ t
0 η
d+2
u dB
d+2
u represent the accrued interest generated by
the margin account. The first two processes are given uniquely in terms of C since ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t
and ηlt = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t , whereas the last one depends on the collateral convention.
2.3 Market Model with Partial Netting
In this section, we consider a specific model with partial netting and collateralization with rehy-
pothecation, which was previously studied in [2]. Besides postulating that the accounts Bl and Bb
may differ, we also allow for the inequality Bi,l 6= Bi,b, i = 1, 2 . . . , d to hold, in general. We also
make the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 2.4 The collateral borrowing account Bd+1 coincides with Bb.
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We follow here the offsetting/netting terminology adopted in [2]. Hence by offsetting we mean
the compensation of long and short positions either for a given risky asset or for the non-risky
asset. This compensation is not relevant, unless the borrowing and lending rates are different for at
least one risky asset or for the cash account. By netting, we mean the aggregation of long or short
cash positions across various risky assets, which share some funding accounts. Obviously, several
alternative models with netting can be studied, for more details, see [2].
In this paper, we focus on the case of partial netting positions across risky assets, which means
that the offsetting of long/short positions for every risky asset combined with some form of netting of
long/short cash positions for all risky assets that are funded from common funding accounts. More
precisely, we postulate that all short cash positions in risky assets S1, S2, . . . , Sd are aggregated
and invested in the common lending account Bl, which means that we assume that Bi,l = Bl for
i = 1, . . . , d. This means that all positive cash flows, inclusive of proceeds from short-selling of
risky assets, are transferred to the cash account Bl. By contrast, long cash positions in risky assets
Si are assumed to be funded from their respective funding accounts Bi,b. For brevity, the trading
framework described in this subsection will be henceforth referred to as the market model with partial
netting.
Accordingly, we consider a trading portfolio (note that ηd+2 = 0 in case of rehypothecation, as
was explained in Remark 2.2)
ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
and the corresponding wealth process for the hedger
Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) = ψ
l
tB
l
t + ψ
b
tB
b
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t + ψ
i,b
t B
i,b
t ) + η
b
tB
c,b
t + η
l
tB
c,l
t .
It follows that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t , ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+. (2.8)
In the present set-up, the hedger’s trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) is self-financing whenever the process
V p(x, ϕ,A,C), which is given by
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) = ψ
l
tB
l
t + ψ
b
tB
b
t +
d∑
i=1
(
ξitS
i
t + ψ
i,b
t B
i,b
t
)
, (2.9)
satisfies
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) = x+
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,t]
ξiu d(S
i
u +A
i
u) +
d∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ψi,bu dB
i,b
u +
∫ t
0
ψlu dB
l
u +
∫ t
0
ψbu dB
b
u
+
∫ t
0
ηbu dB
c,b
u +
∫ t
0
ηlu dB
c,l
u − V
C
t (x, ϕ,A,C) +At (2.10)
where in turn
V Ct (x, ϕ,A,C) = η
b
tB
c,b
t + η
l
tB
c,l
t = −Ct.
From equations (2.8) and (2.9), we get
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) = ψ
l
tB
l
t + ψ
b
tB
b
t −
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−.
Since we postulate that ψlt ≥ 0, ψ
b
t ≤ 0 and ψ
l
tψ
b
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], we also obtain
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)+
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and
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)−
.
Finally, the self-financing condition for the trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) can be represented as follows
dV
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) =
d∑
i=1
ξit (dS
i
t + dA
i
t)−
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
+(Bi,bt )
−1 dB
i,b
t + dA
C
t (2.11)
+
(
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)+
(Blt)
−1 dBlt
−
(
V
p
t (x, ϕ,A,C) +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)−
(Bbt )
−1 dBbt
where AC := A+ C + FC and, in view of Assumption 2.5,
FCt :=
∫ t
0
ηbu dB
c,b
u +
∫ t
0
ηlu dB
c,l
u
= −
∫ t
0
C+u (B
c,b
u )
−1 dBc,bu +
∫ t
0
C−u (B
c,l
u )
−1 dBc,lu (2.12)
= −
∫ t
0
Cu(B
c
u)
−1 dBcu.
In general, one may consider the situation where the hedger and the counterparty are exposed to
a different financial environment, which means that their respective hedging strategies for the same
contract are based on different risky assets, cash accounts, funding accounts and collateral accounts.
To make the analysis less cumbersome, we henceforth assume that the hedger and counterparty face
exactly the same market conditions, but they may have different initial endowments. In particular,
we make the following standing assumption.
Assumption 2.5 The collateral accounts Bc,l and Bc,b satisfy Bc,l = Bc,b = Bc.
Remark 2.3 Suppose that Assumption 2.5 is not postulated, so that the accounts Bc,b and Bc,l
may be different and thus the hedger and the counterparty may be subject to different financial
conditions with respect to the margin account. Then we define the process Θ by setting
Θt := (−A)
−C
t +A
C
t = −
∫ t
0
|Cu|(B
c,b
u )
−1 dBc,bu +
∫ t
0
|Cu|(B
c,l
u )
−1 dBc,lu .
Let us postulate, in addition, that the processes Bc,b and Bc,l are absolutely continuous, so that
dB
c,b
t = r
c,b
t B
c,b
t dt, dB
c,l
t = r
c,l
t B
c,l
t dt,
for some non-negative processes rc,b and rc,l satisfying rc,l ≤ rc,b. The additional assumption that
rc,l ≤ rc,b means that the counterparty has the advantage over the hedger in regard to the margin
account. Indeed, when posting (resp., receiving) the collateral, the counterparty obtains a higher
(resp., lower) interest than the hedger.
Under the assumption that rc,l ≤ rc,b, the process Θ is decreasing and thus Θt ≤ 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, in all foregoing considerations in the paper, the process AC should be replaced by
AC −Θ. For example, in Lemma 3.1 or in Section 4 when we consider the counterparty’s BSDE of
the contract (A,C), we should replace AC by AC −Θ or, equivalently, replace FC by FC −Θ. Since
Θ is a decreasing process, we claim that all the results will still hold, except for Theorem 5.4.
Let us finally mention that if rc,l ≥ rc,b, which means that the hedger has the advantage over
the counterparty in regard to the margin account, then the process Θ is increasing and thus most
results established in what follows will no longer be valid.
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The following commonly standard assumption will allow us to derive more explicit formulae for
the wealth dynamics and thus also to compute the so-called generator (or driver) for the associated
BSDEs.
Assumption 2.6 The riskless accounts are absolutely continuous, so that they can be represented
as follows:
dBlt = r
l
tB
l
t dt, dB
b
t = r
b
tB
b
t dt, dB
i,b
t = r
i,b
t B
i,b
t dt, (2.13)
for some G-adapted processes rl, rb and ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d. Moreover, we assume 0 ≤ rl ≤ rb
and rl ≤ ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
Let the processes S˜i,l,cld and S˜i,b,cld for i = 1, 2, . . . , d be given by the following expressions
S˜
i,l,cld
t := (B
l
t)
−1Sit +
∫
(0,t]
(Blu)
−1 dAiu
and
S˜
i,b,cld
t := (B
b
t )
−1Sit +
∫
(0,t]
(Bbu)
−1 dAiu
so that
dS˜
i,l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
(2.14)
and
dS˜
i,b,cld
t = (B
b
t )
−1
(
dSit − r
b
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
. (2.15)
We also denote
A
C,l
t :=
∫
(0,t]
(Blu)
−1 dACu , A
C,b
t :=
∫
(0,t]
(Bbu)
−1 dACu .
In view (2.11), the following lemmas are straightforward (see also Lemma 5.1 and Remark 5.3 in
[2]).
Lemma 2.1 The discounted wealth Y l := V˜ p,l(x, ϕ,A,C) = (Bl)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) satisfies
dY lt =
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,l,cld
t + f˜l(t, Y
l
t , ξt) dt+ dA
C,l
t
where the mapping f˜l : Ω× [0, T ]× R× R
d → R is given by
f˜l(t, y, z) := (B
l
t)
−1fl(t, B
l
ty, z)− r
l
ty (2.16)
and fl : Ω× [0, T ]× R× R
d → R equals
fl(t, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
rltz
iSit −
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
d∑
i=1
(ziSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
d∑
i=1
(ziSit)
−
)−
.
Lemma 2.2 The discounted wealth Y b := V˜ p,b(x, ϕ,A,C) = (Bb)−1V p(x, ϕ,A,C) satisfies
dY bt =
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,b,cld
t + f˜b(t, Y
b
t , ξt) dt+ dA
C,b
t
where the mapping f˜b : Ω× [0, T ]× R× R
d → R is given by
f˜b(t, y, z) := (B
b
t )
−1fb(t, B
b
ty, z)− r
b
ty (2.17)
and fb : Ω× [0, T ]× R× R
d → R equals
fb(t, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
rbtz
iSit −
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
d∑
i=1
(ziSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
d∑
i=1
(ziSit)
−
)−
.
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3 Arbitrage Opportunities and Ex-Dividend Prices
We consider throughout the hedger’s self-financing trading strategies (x, ϕ,A,C), as specified by
Definition 2.3, where x is the hedger’s initial endowment. We set V 0T (x) := xB
l
T1{x≥0}+xB
b
T1{x<0}
and we define the discounted wealth process V̂ (x, ϕ,A,C) by the following expression, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
V̂t(x, ϕ,A,C) := (B
l
t)
−1Vt(x, ϕ,A,C)1{x≥0} + (B
b
t )
−1Vt(x, ϕ,A,C)1{x<0}.
3.1 Netted Wealth and Arbitrage Opportunities
We first extend the results obtained in Section 3 of [2] to the case of a collateralized contract. For the
financial interpretation of the netted wealth, the reader is referred to [2]. Let us only mention that
A0 = p
A,C ∈ R stands here for a generic price of a contract at time 0, as seen from the perspective
of the hedger.
Definition 3.1 The netted wealth V net(x, ϕ,A,C) of a trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) is given by
V net(x, ϕ,A,C) := V (x, ϕ,A,C)+V (0, ϕ˜,−A,−C) where (0, ϕ˜,−A,−C) is the unique self-financing
strategy satisfying the following conditions:
(i) V0(0, ϕ˜,−A) = −A0,
(ii) ξ˜it = 0 (hence ψ˜
i,b
t = 0 in view of (2.8)) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d and t ∈ [0, T ],
(iii) ψ˜lt ≥ 0, ψ˜
b
t ≤ 0 and ψ˜
l
tψ˜
b
t = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We note that
V net0 (x, ϕ,A,C) = V0(x, ϕ,A,C) + V0(0, ϕ˜,−A,−C) = x+A0 + C0 −A0 − C0 = x,
so that the initial netted wealth V net0 (x, ϕ,A,C) is independent of (A0, C0) and it simply equals the
hedger’s initial endowment.
Definition 3.2 A self-financing trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) is admissible for the hedger whenever
the discounted netted wealth process V̂ net(x, ϕ,A,C) is bounded from below by a constant.
Definition 3.3 An admissible trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) is an arbitrage opportunity for the hedger
with respect to (A,C) whenever
P(V netT (x, ϕ,A,C) ≥ V
0
T (x)) = 1 and P(V
net
T (x, ϕ,A,C) > V
0
T (x)) > 0.
A market model is arbitrage-free for the hedger if no arbitrage opportunities for the hedger exist in
regard to any contract (A,C).
The condition that the discounted netted wealth process V̂ net(x, ϕ,A,C) is bounded from below
by a constant is a commonly used criterion of admissibility, which ensures that, if the process
V̂ net(x, ϕ,A,C) a local martingale under some equivalent probability measure, then it is also a
supermartingale. It is well known that some technical assumption of this nature cannot be avoided
even in the classic case of the Black and Scholes model.
Lemma 3.1 We have V net(x, ϕ,A,C) = V (x, ϕ,A,C) + U(A,C), where the G-adapted process of
finite variation U(A,C) = U is the unique solution to the following equation
Ut =
∫ t
0
(Blu)
−1(Uu − Cu)
+ dBlu −
∫ t
0
(Bbu)
−1(Uu − Cu)
− dBbu −At − F
C
t (3.1)
where FC is defined by (2.12).
10 T. Nie and M. Rutkowski
Proof. We set ξ˜i = ψ˜i,b = 0 in (2.9) and (2.10). Then the process V p := V p(0, ψ˜l, ψ˜b, ηb, ηl,−A,−C)
satisfies V pt = ψ˜
l
tB
l
t + ψ˜
b
tB
b
t for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Noting that V
c := V c(0, ψ˜l, ψ˜b, ηb, ηl,−A,−C) = C
and recalling the definition of FC and AC , we obtain
V
p
t =
∫ t
0
(Blu)
−1(V pu )
+ dBlu −
∫ t
0
(Bbu)
−1(V pu )
− dBbu −At + F
−C
t − V
c
t (0, ψ˜
l, ψ˜b, ηb, ηl,−A,−C)
=
∫ t
0
(Blu)
−1(V pu )
+ dBlu −
∫ t
0
(Bbu)
−1(V pu )
− dBbu −At − F
C
t − Ct
=
∫ t
0
(Blu)
−1(V pu )
+ dBlu −
∫ t
0
(Bbu)
−1(V pu )
− dBbu −A
C
t .
Consequently, the process V := V (0, ψ˜l, ψ˜b, ηb, ηl,−A,−C) = V p + V c satisfies
Vt =
∫ t
0
(Blu)
−1(Vu − Cu)
+ dBlu −
∫ t
0
(Bbu)
−1(Vu − Cu)
− dBbu −At − F
C
t
and thus the assertion of the lemma follows. 
Assumption 3.1 There exists a probability measure P˜l equivalent to P such that the processes
S˜i,l,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are (P˜l,G)-local martingales.
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumptions 2.6 and 3.1, if x ≥ 0, then the market model of Section 2.3
is arbitrage-free for the hedger in regard to any contract (A,C).
Proof. In view of (2.11) and the postulated inequalities: rl ≤ rb and rl ≤ ri,b for all i, the process
V p := V p(x, ϕ,A,C) satisfies
dV
p
t =
d∑
i=1
ξit
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+ dACt
+ rlt
(
V
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rbt
(
V
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)−
dt
≤
d∑
i=1
ξit
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+ dACt
+ rlt
(
V
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rlt
(
V
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
−
)−
dt
= rltV
p
t dt+
d∑
i=1
ξit
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
+ dACt −
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+ rlt
d∑
i=1
(ξitS
i
t)
− dt
≤ rltV
p
t dt+
d∑
i=1
ξit
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
+ dACt .
Consequently, the discounted wealth V l,p := (Bl)−1V p satisfies
dV
l,p
t ≤
d∑
i=1
ξit(B
l
t)
−1
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
+ (Blt)
−1 dACt =
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,l,cld
t + dA
C,l
t .
Furthermore, the netted wealth is given by the following expression (see Lemma 3.1)
V nett (x, ϕ,A,C) = Vt(x, ϕ,A,C) + Ut(A,C) = V
p
t − Ct + Ut(A,C)
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where the G-adapted process of finite variation U(A,C) is given by (3.1). Hence the discounted
netted wealth, which is given by
V˜
l,net
t := (B
l
t)
−1V nett (x, ϕ,A,C) = V
l,p
t − (B
l
t)
−1Ct + (B
l
t)
−1Ut(A,C),
satisfies (for brevity, we write U(A,C) = U)
dV˜
l,net
t = dV
l,p
t − d((B
l
t)
−1Ct) + d((B
l
t)
−1Ut)
≤
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,l,cld
t + (B
l
t)
−2(Ut − Ct)
+ dBlt − (B
l
t)
−1(Bbt )
−1(Ut − Ct)
− dBbt
+ Ut d(B
l
t)
−1 + (Blt)
−1 dACt − (B
l
t)
−1 dAt − (B
l
t)
−1 dFCt − d((B
l
t)
−1Ct)
=
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,l,cld
t + (r
l
t − r
b
t )(B
l
t)
−1(Ut − Ct)
− dt
and thus
V˜
l,net
t − V˜
l,net
0 ≤
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,t]
ξiu dS˜
i,l,cld
u . (3.2)
First, the assumption that the process V˜ l,net is bounded from below, implies that the right-hand
side in (3.2) is a (P˜l,G)-supermartingale, which is null at t = 0. Next, V 0T (x) = B
l
Tx (since x ≥ 0).
From (3.2), we thus obtain
(BlT )
−1
(
V netT (x, ϕ,A) − V
0
T (x)
)
≤
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,T ]
ξit dS˜
i,l,cld
t .
Since P˜l is equivalent to P, we conclude that either V netT (x, ϕ,A,C) = V
0
T (x) or P(V
net
T (x, ϕ,A,C) <
V 0T (x)) > 0. This means that an arbitrage opportunity may not arise and thus the market model
with partial netting is arbitrage-free for the hedger in regard to any contract (A,C). 
Assumption 3.2 There exists a probability measure P˜b equivalent to P such that the processes
S˜i,b,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are (P˜b,G)-local martingales.
Remark 3.1 Similarly as in Remark 3.2 of [2], we observe that the statement of Proposition 3.1 is
also true for x ≤ 0, provided that Assumption 3.2 is valid and rb ≤ ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d. For the
hedger, one can then show that
dV˜
b,net
t ≤
d∑
i=1
ξit dS˜
i,b,cld
t + (r
l
t − r
b
t )(B
b
t )
−1(Ut(A,C)− Ct)
+ dt
and thus, using similar arguments as above, we conclude that there is no arbitrage for the hedger in
regard to any contract (A,C).
Remark 3.2 Let Assumption 2.5 be valid. Then Definition 3.3, Proposition 3.1 and Remark 3.1
apply not only to the hedger, but also to the counterparty. Therefore, if both parties have non-
negative initial endowments (resp., both have non-positive initial endowments), Assumption 3.1
(resp., Assumption 3.2) holds, and rl ≤ ri,b (resp., rb ≤ ri,b) for all i, then the model is arbitrage-
free for both parties. When the initial endowments have opposite signs then if Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2 are valid and rb ≤ ri,b) for all i, then the model is arbitrage-free for both parties.
3.2 Extended Arbitrage Opportunities
Results of Section 3.1 give only a partial answer to the question whether a market model with partial
netting is arbitrage-free. We will now attempt to give a deeper analysis of the arbitrage-free property
for all contracts under specific assumptions on prices of risky assets. To this end, we introduce the
following definition (see Remark 3.1 in [2]).
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Definition 3.4 An extended arbitrage opportunity with respect to the contract (A,C) for the hedger
with the initial endowment x is a pair (x̂, ϕ̂, A) and (x˜, ϕ˜,−A) of admissible strategies such that
x = x̂+ x˜ and
P(V netT ≥ V
0
T (x)) = 1 and P(V
net
T > V
0
T (x)) > 0
where the netted wealth V net = V net(x̂, x˜, ϕ̂, ϕ˜, A, C) is given by
V net := V (x̂, ϕ̂, A, C) + V (x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C).
The next result gives sufficient conditions for non-existence of extended arbitrage opportunities
for the hedger.
Proposition 3.2 Assume that there exist some G-adapted processes βi satisfying rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b
and a probability measure P˜β equivalent to P such that the auxiliary processes S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
which are given by
dS˜
i,cld
t = dS
i
t + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt, (3.3)
are continuous, square-integrable, (P˜β ,G)-martingales. Then no extended arbitrage opportunity ex-
ists for the hedger in respect of any contract (A,C) and any initial endowment x ∈ R.
Proof. Note that the process V̂ p := V p(x̂, ϕ̂, A, C) is governed by
dV̂
p
t =
d∑
i=1
ξ̂it
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+ dACt
+ rlt
(
V̂
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rbt
(
V̂
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
−
)−
dt.
and V˜ p := V p(x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C) satisfies
dV˜
p
t =
d∑
i=1
ξ˜it
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt− dACt
+ rlt
(
V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rbt
(
V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)−
dt.
We observe that the netted wealth satisfies
V net := V (x̂, ϕ̂, A, C) + V (x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C) = V̂ p − C + V˜ p + C = V̂ p + V˜ p
and thus
dV nett =
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂it + ξ˜
i
t)
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt
+ rlt
(
V̂
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rbt
(
V̂
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
−
)−
dt
+ rlt
(
V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)+
dt− rbt
(
V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)−
dt.
Since rl ≤ rb, we obtain
dV nett ≤
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂it + ξ˜
i
t)
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt
+ rlt
(
V̂
p
t + V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
− +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)
dt (3.4)
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and
dV nett ≤
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂it + ξ˜
i
t)
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt
+ rbt
(
V̂
p
t + V˜
p
t +
d∑
i=1
(ξ̂itS
i
t)
− +
d∑
i=1
(ξ˜itS
i
t)
−
)
dt. (3.5)
Using (3.4) and the equality V net = V̂ p + V˜ p, we obtain for the process V˜ l,net := (Bl)−1V net
dV˜
l,net
t = (B
l
t)
−1dV nett − r
l
t(B
l
t)
−1V nett dt
≤ (Blt)
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ̂it
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rlt(ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
− dt
)
+ (Blt)
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ˜it
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rlt(ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
− dt
)
= (Blt)
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ̂it
(
dSit + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rlt(ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
− dt+
d∑
i=1
βit ξ̂
i
tS
i
t dt
)
+ (Blt)
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ˜it
(
dSit + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rlt(ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
− dt+
d∑
i=1
βit ξ˜
i
tS
i
t dt
)
.
Similarly, in view (3.5), the process V˜ b,net := (Bb)−1V net satisfies
dV˜
b,net
t = (B
b
t )
−1dV nett − r
b
t (B
b
t )
−1V nett dt
= (Bbt )
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ̂it
(
dSit + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rbt (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
− dt+
d∑
i=1
βit ξ̂
i
tS
i
t dt
)
+ (Blt)
−1
( d∑
i=1
ξ˜it
(
dSit + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt
)
−
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
+ dt+
d∑
i=1
rbt (ξ˜
i
tS
i
t)
− dt+
d∑
i=1
βit ξ˜
i
tS
i
t dt
)
.
Since the process βi satisfies rl ≤ βi ≤ ri,b for every i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we obtain
d∑
i=1
βit ξ̂
i
tS
i
t ≤
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ −
d∑
i=1
rlt(ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
−.
Under the stronger condition that rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b is satisfied for every i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we also have
that
d∑
i=1
βit ξ̂
i
tS
i
t ≤
d∑
i=1
r
i,b
t (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
+ −
d∑
i=1
rbt (ξ̂
i
tS
i
t)
−.
By assumption, there exists a probability measure P˜β equivalent to P such that the processes
S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are continuous, square-integrable, (P˜β ,G)-martingales, where S˜i,cld is given
by (3.3) for some G-adapted processes βi satisfying rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b. Then
V˜
l,net
t − V˜
l,net
0 ≤
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,t]
(ξ̂iu + ξ˜
i
u) dS˜
i,cld
u (3.6)
and
V˜
b,net
t − V˜
b,net
0 ≤
d∑
i=1
∫
(0,t]
(ξ̂iu + ξ˜
i
u) dS˜
i,cld
u . (3.7)
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Using standard arguments (see the proof of Proposition 3.1), we deduce that the market model
with partial netting is arbitrage-free for the hedger in respect of any contract (A,C) and any initial
endowment x ∈ R. 
Let us now discuss various alternative martingale conditions, which were introduced to analyze
the non-existence of (extended) arbitrage opportunities in the present set-up. First, is easy to see that
Proposition 3.2 furnishes sufficient conditions ensuring that the market model with partial netting
is arbitrage-free with respect to any contract for both parties with arbitrary initial endowments
x1, x2 ∈ R. This motivates the introduction of Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 in Section 5.2. It is fair
to acknowledge that the condition rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b is restrictive and thus this result is not fully
satisfactory. However, we argue below that the condition rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b is needed in the abstract
set-up where ‘risky’ assets are left unspecified, so their prices may in fact be modeled through
continuous processes of finite variation.
It is also worth noting that the condition rb ≤ ri,b in Remark 3.1 was not due to the fact that
we considered there the case when x ≤ 0, but rather to the choice of Bb as a discount factor.
Specifically, we decided to search for a sufficient condition for arbitrage-free property in terms of
a martingale measure for processes S˜i,b,cld. Since we do not make any a priori assumptions about
the price processes for risky assets, it may happen that, for instance, S1 = S10B
b and A1 = 0. Of
course, a martingale measure for the process S˜1,b,cld exists, but the sub-model (Bl, Bb, B1,b, S1) is
not arbitrage-free unless rb ≤ r1,b. Indeed, in the present set-up, the rate r1,b (resp. rb) can be seen
as a borrowing (resp., lending) rate, since the non-risky return rb can be generated by the hedger
by purchasing the stock S1. This argument shows that the inequality rb ≤ ri,b is necessary to avoid
arbitrage if we do not make any other assumptions about risky asset except for postulating the
existence of a martingale measure for S˜1,b,cld (by contrast, if the stock price S1 is given, say, by the
Black and Scholes model then there is no need to postulate that rb ≤ ri,b since any investment in
S1 is risky).
The condition that a martingale measure for S˜1,b,cld exists is, in some sense, weaker that the
postulate that a martingale measure for S˜1,l,cld exists. Indeed, in the latter case, when the asset
price is of finite variation, it equals to S0B
l (rather than S0B
b) and thus one could conjecture that
the condition rl ≤ r1,b is sufficient to preclude arbitrage in the sub-model (Bl, Bb, B1,b, S1). This
is indeed true when x ≥ 0, but when x < 0 and rl < rb, there still exists an arbitrage opportunity,
since the hedger may sell stock and reduce interest payments on his debt.
Finally, one could postulate that the process Bi,b could be chosen as a discount factor for the
ith risky asset. In that case, to preclude an arbitrage opportunity of the same kind as above when
x < 0, one would need to postulate that ri,b ≥ rb.
In our opinion, the condition that a martingale measure for S˜i,l,cld exists is more natural but,
as was explained above, it is not a sufficient condition for no-arbitrage if a ‘risky’ asset may in
fact by non-risky. Of course, in a non-trivial model where the prices of risky assets have non-
vanishing volatilities, the above-mentioned martingale conditions will be equivalent, under mild
technical assumptions, and conditions rl ≤ rb and rl ≤ ri,b that underpin Proposition 3.1 should
suffice to ensure that a model is arbitrage-free for both parties with arbitrary initial endowments.
3.3 Fair and Profitable Bilateral Prices
Our next goal is to describe the range of arbitrage prices of a contract with cash flows A and collateral
C. It is rather clear from the next definition that a hedger’s fair price may depend on the hedger’s
initial endowment x and it may fail to be unique, in general.
Definition 3.5 We say that a real number pA,C = A0 is a hedger’s fair price for (A,C) at time 0
whenever for any self-financing trading strategy (x, ϕ,A,C), such that the discounted wealth process
V̂ (x, ϕ,A,C) is bounded from below, we have that
P
(
VT (x, ϕ,A,C) = V
0
T (x)
)
= 1 or P
(
VT (x, ϕ,A,C) < V
0
T (x)
)
> 0. (3.8)
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One may observe that the two conditions in Definition 3.5 are analogous to conditions of Defi-
nition 3.3, although they have different financial meaning. Recall that Definition 3.3 deals with a
possibility of offsetting a dynamically hedged contract (A,C) with an arbitrary market price by an
unhedged contract (−A,−C), whereas Definition 3.5 is concerned with finding a unilateral fair price
for (A,C) from the perspective of the hedger. For a more detailed discussion, the interested reader
may consult [2].
Let us recall the generic definition of replication of a contract on [t, T ] (see Definition 5.1 in [2]).
Definition 3.6 For a fixed t ∈ [0, T ], a self-financing trading strategy (V 0t (x) + p
A,C
t , ϕ, A−At, C),
where pA,Ct is a Gt-measurable random variable, is said to replicate the collateralized contract (A,C)
on [t, T ] whenever VT (V
0
t (x) + p
A,C
t , ϕ, A−At, C) = V
0
T (x).
We henceforth assume that the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) is x1
(resp., x2) where x1, x2 ∈ R. We consider the situation when the hedger with the initial endowment
x1 at time 0 enters the contract A at time t and the contract can be replicated by the hedger.
Definition 3.7 Any Gt-measurable random variable for which a replicating strategy for A over [t, T ]
exists is called the hedger’s ex-dividend price at time t for the contract (A,C) and it is denoted by
P ht (x1, A, C), so that for some ϕ replicating (A,C)
VT (V
0
t (x1) + P
h
t (x1, A, C), ϕ, A −At, C) = V
0
T (x1).
Definition 3.8 For an arbitrary level x2 of the counterparty’s initial endowment and a strategy ϕ
replicating (−A,−C), the counterparty’s ex-dividend price P ct (x2,−A,−C) at time t for the contract
(−A,−C) is given by the equality
VT (V
0
t (x2)− P
c
t (x2,−A,−C), ϕ,−A+ At,−C) = V
0
T (x2).
It is clear that in Definitions 3.7 and 3.8, we deal with unilateral prices, as evaluated by the
hedger and the counterparty, respectively. Note that if x1 = x2 = x, then P
h
t (x,A,C) = p
A,C
t and
P ct (x,−A,−C) = −p
−A,−C
t . Due to this convention, the equality P
h
t (x1, A, C) = P
c
t (x1,−A,−C)
will be satisfied when Definitions 3.7 and 3.8 applied to a standard market model with a single cash
account in which the prices are known to be independent of initial endowments x1 and x2. The
next definition is consistent with this convention. Note that Definition 3.9 is based on an implicit
assumption that prices are uniquely defined; we address this important issue in the foregoing section.
Definition 3.9 The hedger is willing to sell (resp., to buy) a contract (A,C) if P ht (x1, A, C) ≥ 0
(resp., P ht (x1, A, C) ≤ 0). The counterparty is willing to sell (resp., to buy) a contract (−A,−C) if
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ 0 (resp., P
c
t (x2,−A,−C) ≥ 0).
Since we place ourselves in a nonlinear framework, a natural asymmetry arises between the
hedger and his counterparty, so that the price discrepancy may occur, meaning that it may happen
that P ht (x1, A, C) 6= P
c
t (x2,−A,−C). However, it is expected that the two prices will typically yield
a no-arbitrage range determined by the (higher) seller’s price and the (lower) buyer’s price, though
it may also happen that both parties are willing to be sellers (or both are willing to be buyers) of
a given contract. In addition, since a positive excess cash generated by one contract may be offset
(partly or totally) by a negative excess cash associated with another contract, we expect that the
seller’s (resp., buyer’s) price for the combination of two contracts should be lower (resp., higher)
than the sum of the seller’s (resp., buyer’s) prices of individual contracts.
Example 3.1 Let us consider a contract (A,C) with C = 0 and At = p1[0,T ](t)+X1[T ](t). If X =
−(SiT−K)
+, then we deal with a European call option written by the hedger. A natural guess is that
the prices P h0 (x1, A, C) and P
c
0 (x2,−A,−C) should be positive. Similarly, if X = (S
i
T −K)
+, that
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the counterparty is the option’s writer, it is natural to expect that P h0 (x1, A, C) and P
c
0 (x2,−A,−C)
should be negative. Furthermore, if C = 0 and At = p1[0,T ](t)−(S
i
T−K)
+1[T ](t), then we guess that
the price P h0 (x1, A, C) should be independent of x1, provided that x1 ≥ 0. Indeed, as a consequence
of the last constraint in (2.8), the hedger cannot use his initial endowment to buy shares for the
purpose of hedging. In view of this constraint, the postulated model does not cover the standard
case of different borrowing and lending rates when ri,b = rb > rl and trading is assumed to be
unrestricted, so that the hedger’s initial endowment can be used for hedging.
In the standard case, it is natural to expect that the hedger’s price of the call option will depend
on the hedger’s initial endowment x1. To sum up, for each particular market circumstances, the
properties of ex-dividend prices may be quite different. Nevertheless, we will argue that most of
their properties can be analyzed using general results on BSDEs as a convenient tool.
Recall that x1 and x2 stand for the initial endowments of the hedger and the counterparty, re-
spectively. Due to a generic nature of a contract (A,C), it is impossible to make any plausible a priori
conjectures about relative sizes and/or signs of prices. The equality P ht (x,A,C) = P
c
t (x,−A,−C)
means that both parties agree on a common price for the contract. Otherwise, that is, if the equality
P ht (x,A,C) = P
c
t (x,−A,−C) fails to hold, then the following situations may arise:
(H.1) 0 ≤ P ct (x2,−A,−C) < P
h
t (x1, A, C),
(H.2) P ct (x1, A, C) ≤ 0 < P
h
t (x2,−A,−C),
(H.3) P ct (x2,−A,−C) < P
h
t (x1, A, C) ≤ 0,
and, symmetrically,
(C.1) 0 ≤ P ht (x1, A, C) < P
c
t (x2,−A,−C),
(C.2) P ht (x1, A, C) ≤ 0 < P
c
t (x2,−A,−C),
(C.3) P ht (x1, A, C) < P
c
t (x2,−A,−C) ≤ 0.
Before analyzing each situation, let us recall that the cash flows of a contract (A,C) are invariably
considered from the perspective of the hedger, so it makes sense to observe that the counterparty
faces the cash flows given by (−A,−C). Consequently, in case (H.1), we may say that the hedger is
the seller of (A,C) and the counterparty is the buyer of (−A,−C), but the counterparty is not willing
to pay the amount demanded by the hedger. In case (H.2), both parties are willing to be sellers
of the contract, meaning in practice that the hedger is ready to sell (A,C) and the counterparty is
willing to sell (−A,−C). Finally, case (H.3) refers to the situation the counterparty is willing to
be the seller of (−A,−C), whereas the hedger can now be seen as a buyer of (A,C), but he is not
willing to pay the price that is needed by the counterparty to replicate the contract.
Assume that the market model is arbitrage-free for both parties in the sense of Definition 3.3.
Then in all three cases, (H.1)–(H.3), any Gt-measurable random variable P
f
t satisfying
P
f
t ∈
[
P ct (x2,−A,−C), P
h
t (x1, A, C)
]
(3.9)
can be considered to be a fair price for both the hedger and his counterparty, in the sense that a
bilateral transaction done at the price P ft will not generate an arbitrage opportunity for neither of
them. Hence the interval [P c(x2,−A,−C), P
h
t (x1, A, C)] represents the range of fair prices of the
contract (A,C) for both parties, as seen from the perspective of the hedger (a special case of this
interval was dubbed the arbitrage-band by Bergman [1]).
Definition 3.10 The Gt-measurable intervalR
f
t (x1, x2) :=
[
P ct (x2,−A,−C), P
h
t (x1, A, C)
]
is called
the range of fair bilateral prices at time t of an OTC contract (A,C) between the hedger and the
counterparty.
Although the analysis for the cases (C.1)–(C.3) can be done analogously, the financial interpre-
tation and conclusions are quite different. In case (C.1), the hedger is willing to be the seller of
(A,C) and the counterparty is willing to be the buyer and he is ready to pay even more than it is
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requested by the hedger. In case (C.2), both parties are disposed to be buyers at their respective
prices, meaning that each party is ready to pay a positive premium to another. Finally, in case
(C.3), the counterparty is willing to be the seller, whereas the hedger can now be seen as a buyer
of (A,C) and he is ready to pay more than it is demanded by the counterparty. Hence for any
Gt-measurable random variable P
p
t satisfying
P
p
t ∈
[
P ht (x1, A, C), P
c
t (x2,−A,−C)
]
(3.10)
can be seen as a price at which both parties would be disposed to make the deal with each other.
Note that, unless P ht (x1, A, C) = P
c
t (x2,−A,−C), the price P
p
t is not a fair bilateral price, in the
sense explained above, since an arbitrage opportunity arises for at least one party involved when an
OTC contract (A,C) is traded between them at the price P pt . This simple observation motivates
the following definition.
Definition 3.11 Assume that the inequality P ht (x1, A, C) 6= P
c
t (x2,−A,−C) holds. Then the Gt-
measurable interval Rpt (x1, x2) :=
[
P ht (x1, A, C), P
c
t (x2,−A,−C)
]
is called the range of bilaterally
profitable prices at time t of an OTC contract (A,C) between the hedger and the counterparty.
Note that in our discussion, we dealt in fact with at least three different concepts of arbitrage:
(A.1) the classic definition of an arbitrage opportunity that may arise by trading in primary assets,
(A.2) an arbitrage opportunity associated with a long hedged position in some contract combined
with a short unhedged position in the same contract; in that case, the contract’s price at time 0 is
considered to be exogenously given by the market, that is, it is driven by the law of demand and
supply (see Definition 3.3 of an arbitrage in regard to a given contract),
(A.3) an arbitrage opportunity related to the fact that the hedger and the counterparty may require
different premia to implement their respective replicating strategies; if this kind of an arbitrage
opportunity arises, then it is simultaneously available to both parties involved in an OTC contract
with a price negotiated between them (as in Definition 3.11).
Note that in case (C.2) an immediate reselling arbitrage opportunity arises for a third party,
that is, a trader who could simultaneously ‘purchase’ a contract from one party and ‘resell’ to the
other. Specifically, if P ht (x1, A, C) ≤ 0 and P
c
t (x2,−A,−C) > 0, then a third party can make a deal
with the hedger to face (−A,−C) and receive −P ht (x1, A, C) ≥ 0 and, at the same time, enter the
contract with the counterparty to face (A,C) and get P ct (x2,−A,−C) > 0. This offsetting strategy
produces an immediate profit of P ct (x2,−A,−C)− P
h
t (x1, A, C) > 0 for the third party.
4 Pricing BSDEs and Replicating Strategies
Our next aim is to show that the hedger’s and counterparty’s prices and their replicating strategies
can be found by solving suitable BSDEs. For this purpose, we will use some auxiliary results on
BSDEs driven by multi-dimensional continuous martingales (see [14] and the references therein).
In Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we will show that if x1x2 ≥ 0, then the prices P
h
t (x1, A, C) and
P ct (x2,−A,−C) are given by the solutions of two BSDEs that are driven by either the common
(P˜l,G)-local martingale S˜l,cld (when x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0) or the common (P˜
b,G)-local martingale S˜b,cld
(when x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≤ 0). By contrast, when the inequality x1x2 < 0 holds, say x1 > 0 and x2 < 0, then
the prices are associated with solutions to the two BSDEs driven by S˜l,cld and S˜b,cld, respectively.
Therefore, to find the range of fair (or profitable) bilateral prices using the comparison theorem for
BSDEs, we will first need to find a suitable variant of the pricing BSDE for both parties, which will
be driven by a common continuous local martingale (see Section 5.2).
4.1 Modeling of Risky Assets
To show the existence of a solution to the pricing BSDE, we need to complement Assumptions 3.1
and 3.2 by imposing specific conditions on the underlying market model. For any d × d matrix m,
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the norm of m is given by |m|2 := Tr(mm∗). In the next assumption, the superscript k stands for
either l or b.
Assumption 4.1 We postulate that:
(i) the process S˜,cld is a continuous, square-integrable, (P˜k,G)-martingale and has the predictable
representation property (PRP) with respect to the filtration G under P˜k,
(ii) there exists an Rd×d-valued, G-adapted process mk such that
〈S˜k,cld〉t =
∫ t
0
mku(m
k
u)
∗ du (4.1)
where mk(mk)∗ is invertible and there exists a constant Km > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|mkt |+ |(m
k
t (m
k
t )
∗)−
1
2 | ≤ Km, (4.2)
(iii) the price processes Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d of risky assets are bounded.
Note that condition (4.2) means that the process ml satisfies Assumption 5.2 in [14]. Although
the postulate that the prices Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are bounded can be seen as a quite reasonable real-
world requirement, it is rarely satisfied in commonly used financial models, including the classic Black
and Scholes model. It is also worth noting that condition (4.2) could appear to be too restrictive.
In order to relax this condition, we will need to impose stronger conditions on the process 〈S˜l,cld〉.
Specifically, we define the matrix-valued process S
St :=

S1t 0 . . . 0
0 S2t . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Sdt
 .
Definition 4.1 We say that γ satisfies the ellipticity condition if there exists a constant Λ > 0
d∑
i,j=1
(γtγ
∗
t )ij aiaj ≥ Λ|a|
2 = Λa∗a, for all a ∈ Rd and t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.3)
We consider the following assumption, which should be seen as an alternative to Assumption 4.1.
Once again, the superscript k is equal either to l or b.
Assumption 4.2 We postulate that:
(i) the process S˜k,cld is a continuous, square-integrable, (P˜k,G)-martingale and has the PRP with
respect to the filtration G under P˜k,
(ii) equality (4.1) holds with the G-adapted process mk such that mk(mk)∗ is invertible and satisfies
mk(mk)∗ = Sγγ∗S where a d-dimensional square matrix γ of G-adapted processes satisfies the
ellipticity condition (4.3).
Remark 4.1 We will show that Assumption 4.1 or 4.2 can be easily met when the prices of risky
assets are given by the diffusion-type model. For example, we may assume that each risky asset
Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d has the ex-dividend price dynamics under P given by
dSit = S
i
t
(
µit dt+
d∑
j=1
σ
ij
t dW
j
t
)
, Si0 > 0,
or, equivalently, the d-dimensional process S = (S1, . . . , Sd)∗ satisfies
dSt = St(µt dt+ σt dWt)
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whereW = (W 1, . . . ,W d)∗ is the d-dimensional Brownian motion, µ = (µ1, . . . , µd)∗ is an Rd-valued,
FW -adapted process, σ = [σij ] is a d-dimensional square matrix of FW -adapted processes satisfying
the ellipticity condition. We now set G = FW and we recall that the d-dimensional Brownian
motion W enjoys the predictable representation property with respect to its natural filtration FW ;
this property is shared by the process W˜ defined (4.5).
Assuming that the corresponding dividend processes are given by Ait =
∫ t
0
κiuS
i
u du, we obtain
dS˜
i,l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
(
dSit + dA
i
t − r
l
tS
i
t dt
)
= (Blt)
−1Sit
((
µit + κ
i
t − r
l
t
)
dt+
d∑
j=1
σ
ij
t dW
j
t
)
.
If we denote Sl,cld = (S1,l,cld, . . . , Sd,l,cld)∗ and µ+ κ− rl = (µ1 + κ1 − rl, . . . , µd + κd − rl)∗, then
dS˜
l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
St
((
µt + κt − r
l
t
)
dt+ σt dWt
)
.
We set at := σ
−1
t (µt+κt− r
l
t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and we define the probability measure P˜
l on (Ω,FWT )
by
dP˜l
dP
= exp
{
−
∫ T
0
at dWt −
1
2
∫ T
0
|at|
2 dt
}
. (4.4)
Then P˜l is equivalent to P and, from the Girsanov theorem, the process W˜ := (W˜ 1, W˜ 2, . . . , W˜ d)∗
is a Brownian motion under P˜l, where
dW˜t := dWt + at dt = dWt + σ
−1
t (µt + κt − r
l
t) dt. (4.5)
It is clear that under P˜l
dS˜
l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
Stσt dW˜t.
Therefore, if the processes µ, σ and κ are bounded, then the processes S˜i,l,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are
continuous, square-integrable, (P˜l,G)-martingales. Furthermore, the quadratic variation of S˜l,cld
equals
〈S˜l,cld〉t =
∫ t
0
mlu(m
l
u)
∗ du
whereml(ml)∗ = SγγS and γ := (Bl)−1σ. Obviously,ml(ml)∗ is invertible and thus Assumption 4.2
is satisfied. Moreover, if the processes Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are bounded, then the process ml satisfies
condition (4.2) and thus Assumption 4.1 is valid with k = l.
4.2 Hedgers’s Prices and Replicating Strategies
From now on, we work under the standing assumption that Qt = t for every t ∈ [0, T ] in Assumption
3.1 in [14] and thus also in all results in Sections 3–5 of [14] (in particular, in the definition of the
norm for the space Ĥ2,dλ ). Note that this postulate is consistent with either of Assumptions 4.1
and 4.2. Moreover, we henceforth postulate that the processes rl, rb and ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d are
nonnegative and bounded.
The following result describes the prices and hedging strategies for the hedger. Recall that
AC := A+ C + FC and
FCt = −
∫ t
0
(Bc,bu )
−1C+u dB
c,b
u +
∫ t
0
(Bc,lu )
−1C−u dB
c,l
u .
Following [14], but with Qt = t, we denote by Ĥ
2,d
0 the subspace of all R
d-valued, G-adapted
processes X with
|X |2
Ĥ2,d
0
:= EP
[ ∫ T
0
‖Xt‖
2 dt
]
<∞. (4.6)
Also, let L̂20 stand for the space of all real-valued, GT -measurable random variables η such that
|η|2
L̂2
0
= EP(η
2) <∞.
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Definition 4.2 A contract (A,C) is admissible under P˜l if the process AC,l belongs to Ĥ20 and the
random variable AC,lT belongs to L̂
2
0 under P˜
l. A contract (A,C) is admissible under P˜b if the process
AC,b belongs to Ĥ20 and the random variable A
C,b
T belongs to L̂
2
0 under P˜
b.
Proposition 4.1 (i) Let either Assumption 4.1 or Assumption 4.2 with k = l be satisfied. Then for
any real number x ≥ 0 and any contract (A,C) admissible under P˜l, the hedger’s ex-dividend price
satisfies P h(x,A,C) = Bl(Y h,l,x − x)−C where (Y h,l,x, Zh,l,x) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY
h,l,x
t = Z
h,l,x,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + f˜l
(
t, Y
h,l,x
t , Z
h,l,x
t
)
dt+ dAC,lt ,
Y
h,l,x
T = x.
(4.7)
The unique replicating strategy equals ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where, for every
t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
ξit = Z
h,l,x,i
t , ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+, ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t ,
and
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
BltY
h,l,x
t +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)+
,
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
BltY
h,l,x
t +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)−
.
(ii) Let either Assumption 4.1 or Assumption 4.2 with k = b be satisfied. Then for any real num-
ber x ≤ 0 and any contract (A,C) admissible under P˜b, the hedger’s ex-dividend price satisfies
P h(x,A,C) = Bb(Y h,b,x − x)− C where (Y h,b,x, Zh,b,x) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY
h,b,x
t = Z
h,b,x,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t + f˜b
(
t, Y
h,b,x
t , Z
h,b,x
t
)
dt+ dAC,bt ,
Y
h,b,x
T = x.
(4.8)
The unique replicating strategy equals ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where, for every
t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
ξit = Z
h,b,x,i
t , ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+, ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t ,
and
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
BbtY
h,b,x
t +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)+
,
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
BbtY
h,b,x
t +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)−
.
Proof. Assume first that x ≥ 0. Then, from Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 in [14], we know that if either
Assumption 4.1 or Assumption 4.2 with k = l is satisfied and AC,l ∈ Ĥ20 and A
C,l
T ∈ L̂
2
0 under P˜
l,
then BSDE (4.7) has a unique solution (Y h,l,x, Zh,l,x). Thus, from Proposition 5.2 in [2] we obtain
P h(x,A,C) = Bl(Y h,l,x−x)−C. Moreover, the replicating strategy ϕ can be constructed uniquely,
as was explained in Section 2.3. In view of Remark 5.3 in [2], an analogous analysis can be done
when the initial endowment satisfies x ≤ 0 . 
Remark 4.2 Let us give some comments on the uniqueness of a replicating strategy in Proposition
4.1. We only consider the case when x ≥ 0, since similar arguments apply to the case x ≤ 0. The
uniqueness of the solution of BSDE (4.7) means that if (Y 1, Z1) and (Y 2, Z2) are two solutions of
BSDE (4.7), then
E
P˜l
[ ∫ T
0
|Y 1t − Y
2
t |
2 dt+
∫ T
0
‖(mlt)
∗Z1t − (m
l
t)
∗Z2t ‖
2 dt
]
= 0. (4.9)
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Under Assumption 4.1, there exists a constant km such that |(m
l
t)
∗| ≥ km and a constant K such
that |St| ≤ K. Therefore, from (4.9) we deduce that
E
P˜l
[ ∫ T
0
‖StZ
1
t − StZ
2
t ‖
2 dt
]
= 0. (4.10)
Under Assumption 4.2 with k = l, we have that ml(ml)∗ = Sγγ∗S and thus
E
P˜l
[ ∫ T
0
‖(mlt)
∗(Z1t − Z
2
t )‖
2 dt
]
= E
P˜l
[∫ T
0
(Z1t − Z
2
t )
∗
Sγγ∗S(Z1t − Z
2
t ) dt
]
.
Since γ satisfies the ellipticity condition, there exists a constant Λ > 0 such that
E
P˜l
[∫ T
0
(Z1t − Z
2
t )
∗
Stγγ
∗
St(Z
1
t − Z
2
t ) dt
]
≥ ΛE
P˜l
[∫ T
0
‖StZ
1
t − StZ
2
t ‖
2 dt
]
.
We conclude that under either of Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 with k = l, equality (4.10) is satisfied by
any two solutions of BSDE (4.7).
From the above arguments and the structure of the replicating strategy (see Proposition 4.1)
ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
,
we know that the uniqueness is in the sense of equivalence with respect to Pl ⊗ ℓ. Moreover, for
ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξd)∗, ψl, ψb and ψ = (ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b)∗ the uniqueness holds in the following norm
‖ϕ‖ := E
P˜l
[ ∫ T
0
‖Stξt‖
2dt+
∫ T
0
(|ψlt|
2 + |ψbt |
2)dt+
∫ T
0
‖ψt‖
2dt
]
.
4.3 Counterparty’s Prices and Replicating Strategies
Let us first observe that, in view of Assumption 2.5, we have (−A)−C = −AC . Using Definition 3.8,
one can prove the following result for the counterparty.
Proposition 4.2 Let the assumptions of part (i) or (ii) in Proposition 4.1 be satisfied for x ≥ 0
and x ≤ 0, respectively. Then the counterparty’s ex-dividend price satisfies, for every t ∈ [0, T ),
P ct (x,−A,−C) = −
(
Blt(Y
c,l,x
t − x) + Ct
)
1{x≥0} −
(
Bbt (Y
c,b,x
t − x) + Ct
)
1{x≤0}
where (Y c,l,x, Zc,l,x) and (Y c,b,x, Zc,b,x) is respectively the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY
c,l,x
t = Z
c,l,x,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + f˜l
(
t, Y
c,l,x
t , Z
c,l,x
t
)
dt− dAC,lt ,
Y
c,l,x
T = x,
(4.11)
and {
dY
c,b,x
t = Z
c,b,x,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t + f˜b
(
t, Y
c,b,x
t , Z
c,b,x
t
)
dt− dAC,bt ,
Y
c,b,x
T = x.
(4.12)
The unique replicating strategy equals ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where, for every
t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
ξt = Z
c,l,x
t 1{x≥0} + Z
c,b,x
t 1{x≤0}, ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+, ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C−t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C+t ,
and
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
BltY
c,l,x
t 1{x≥0} +B
b
tY
c,b,x
t 1{x≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)+
,
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
BltY
c,l,x
t 1{x≥0} +B
b
tY
c,b,x
t 1{x≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)−
.
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5 Properties of Arbitrage Prices
Recall that we consider the special case of an exogenous margin account with rehypothecated cash
collateral. The exogenous property implies that C does not depend on a strategy ϕ and the value
of the strategy. We denote the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., counterparty) by x1 (resp.,
x2). We will examine the pricing and hedging problems for both parties in the following situations:
– the initial endowments satisfy x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0,
– the initial endowments satisfy x1 ≤ 0 and x2 ≤ 0,
– the initial endowments satisfy x1x2 ≤ 0.
Our goal is to establish inequalities for unilateral prices for each of the three above-mentioned
cases (see Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4, respectively) and thus also to derive the ranges of fair
bilateral prices. In the last case, that is, when x1x2 ≤ 0 we also examine the properties of the class
of monotone contracts (see Section 5.2.2). Finally, we study the monotonicity of unilateral prices
with respect to the initial endowment and we derive the pricing PDE in the Markovian framework.
5.1 Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
We first assume that both parties have positive initial endowments, that is, x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0. The
proof of Proposition 5.1 is provided in Nie and Rutkowski [14] (see Theorem 5.2 in [14]), where a
suitable comparison theorem for BSDEs driven by a multi-dimensional martingale is also proven.
Proposition 5.1 Let either Assumption 4.1 or Assumption 4.2 with k = l hold. If x1 ≥ 0 and
x2 ≥ 0, then for any contract (A,C) admissible under P˜
l we have, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
l − a.s., (5.1)
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
In the second step, we postulate that both parties have positive initial endowments, that is,
x1 ≤ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. As was explained in Remark 3.1, we now need assume that r
b
t ≤ r
i,b
t for
i = 1, 2, . . . , d. The proof of Proposition 5.2 is postponed to the appendix.
Proposition 5.2 Let either Assumption 4.1 or Assumption 4.2 with k = b hold. If x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≤ 0
and rb ≤ ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, then for any contract (A,C) admissible under P˜b we have, for all
t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
b − a.s., (5.2)
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
5.2 Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
We now consider the case when the initial endowments of the two parties have opposite signs,
specifically, we postulate that x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, it follows that
P h(x1, A, C) = B
l(Y h,l,x1 − x1)− C where (Y
h,l,x1 , Zh,l,x1) is the unique solution of the BSDE{
dY
h,l,x1
t = Z
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t + f˜l
(
t, Y
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t
)
dt+ dAC,lt ,
Y
h,l,x1
T = x1,
and P c(x2,−A,−C) = −(B
b(Y c,b,x2 − x2) +C) where (Y
c,b,x2 , Zc,b,x2) is the unique solution of the
BSDE {
dY
c,b,x2
t = Z
c,b,x2,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t + f˜b
(
t, Y
c,b,x2
t , Z
c,b,x2
t
)
dt− dAC,bt ,
Y
c,b,x2
T = x2.
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Note that the BSDE for Y h,l,x1 is driven by the (P˜l,G)-local martingale S˜l,cld, but the BSDE
for Y c,b,x2 is driven by the (P˜b,G)-local martingale S˜b,cld. We will now attempt to find another
probability measure P˜ equivalent to P and a (P˜,G)-local martingale S˜cld such that the BSDEs
related to P h(x1, A, C) and P
c(x2, A, C) are both driven by a common (P˜
b,G)-local martingale
S˜cld. If we denote Y˜ h,l,x1 = Bl(Y h,l,x1 −x1), then P
h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,l,x1 −C. In view of (2.14) and
(2.16), we obtain
dY˜
h,l,x1
t = −x1 dB
l
t + Y
h,l,x1
t dB
l
t +B
l
t dY
h,l,x1
t
= − x1r
l
tB
l
t dt+ r
l
tB
l
tY
h,l,x1
t dt+B
l
tZ
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
l,cld
t +B
l
tf˜l
(
t, Y
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t
)
dt+ dACt
= − x1r
l
tB
l
t dt+ r
l
tB
l
tY
h,l,x1
t dt+
∑d
i=1 Z
h,l,x1,i
t
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
+ fl
(
t, BltY
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t
)
dt
− rltB
l
tY
h,l,x1
t dt+ dA
C
t
= − x1r
l
tB
l
t dt+
∑d
i=1 Z
h,l,x1,i
t
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
+
∑d
i=1 r
l
tZ
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t dt−
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (Z
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
+ dt+ rlt
(
BltY
h,l,x1
t +
∑d
i=1(Z
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
−
)+
dt
− rbt
(
BltY
h,l,x1
t +
∑d
i=1(Z
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
−
)−
dt+ dACt
= − x1r
l
tB
l
t dt+
∑d
i=1 Z
h,l,x1,i
t
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
+ g(t, BltY
h,l,x1
t , Z
h,l,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t
where
g(t, y, z) = −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−
. (5.3)
Upon denoting Z˜h,l,x1 = Zh,l,x1 , we obtain
dY˜
h,l,x1
t =
∑d
i=1Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
− x1r
l
tB
l
tdt+ g
(
t, Y˜
h,l,x1
t + x1B
l
t, Z˜
h,l,x1
t
)
dt+ dACt .
Similarly, if we denote Y˜ c,b,x2 = −Bb(Y c,b,x2 − x2) and Z˜
c,b,x2 = −Zc,b,x2, then the counterparty’s
price equals P c(x2, A, C) = Y˜
c,b,x2 − C. In view of (2.15), (2.17) and (5.3), we obtain
dY˜
c,b,x2
t = x2 dB
b
t − Y
c,b,x2
t dB
b
t −B
b
t dY
c,b,x2
t
= x2r
b
tB
b
t dt− r
b
tB
b
tY
c,b,x2
t dt−B
b
tZ
c,b,x2,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t −B
l
tf˜b
(
t, Y
c,b,x2
t , Z
c,b,x2
t
)
dt+ dACt
= x2r
b
tB
b
t dt− r
b
tB
b
tY
c,b,x2
t dt−
∑d
i=1 Z
c,b,x2,i
t
(
dSit − r
b
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
− fb
(
t, BbtY
c,b,x2
t , Z
c,b,x2
t
)
dt
+ rbtB
b
tY
h,l,x1
t dt+ dA
C
t
= x2r
b
tB
b
t dt−
∑d
i=1 Z
c,b,x2,i
t
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
− g(t, BltY
c,b,x2
t , Z
c,b,x2
t ) dt+ dA
C
t
=
∑d
i=1 Z˜
c,b,x2,i
t
(
dSit + dA
i
t
)
+ x2r
b
tB
b
t dt− g
(
t,−Y˜ c,b,x2t + x2B
b
t ,−Z˜
c,b,x2
t
)
dt+ dACt .
The following assumptions are motivated by Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Assumption 5.1 We postulate that:
(i) there exists a probability measure P˜β equivalent to P such that the processes S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d
given by
dS˜
i,cld
t = dS
i
t + dA
i
t − β
i
tS
i
t dt (5.4)
for some G-adapted processes βi satisfying rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b, are continuous, square-integrable (P˜β ,G)-
martingales, and have the PRP with respect to the filtration G under P˜β,
(ii) there exists an Rd×d-valued, G-adapted process m such that
〈S˜cld〉t =
∫ t
0
mum
∗
u du, (5.5)
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where m(m)∗ is invertible and there exists a constant Km > 0 such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|mt|+ |(mt(mt)
∗)−
1
2 | ≤ Km, (5.6)
(iii) the price processes Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , d of risky assets are bounded.
Assumption 5.2 We postulate that:
(i) there exists a probability measure P˜β equivalent to P such that the processes S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d
given by (5.4) are (P˜β ,G)-continuous square integrable martingales, and have the PRP with respect
to the filtration G under P˜β ,
(ii) condition (5.5) holds with the G-adapted process m such that mm∗ is invertible and given by
mm∗ = Sγγ∗S where a d-dimensional square matrix γ of G-adapted processes satisfies the ellipticity
condition (4.3).
Remark 5.1 Recall that
dS˜
i,l,cld
t = (B
l
t)
−1
(
dSit − r
l
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
, dS˜
i,b,cld
t = (B
b
t )
−1
(
dSit − r
b
tS
i
t dt+ dA
i
t
)
.
Since rl is non-negative and bounded, we obtain C0 < (B
l)−1 < 1 for some constant C0. Then
Assumption 5.1 with βi = rl is equivalent to Assumption 3.1. Similar comments apply to other
assumptions. We mention that, from Proposition 3.2 and rb ≤ βi ≤ ri,b, we know that under
Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2, our partial netting model is arbitrage-free with respect to any
contract for both the hedger and counterparty with x1, x2 ∈ R.
Remark 5.2 The above assumptions can be easily satisfied for the diffusion-type market model
similarly to the one in Remark 4.1; the details are left to the reader.
Definition 5.1 We say that (A,C) is admissible under P˜β when AC ∈ Ĥ20 and A
C
T ∈ L̂
2
0 under P˜
β .
For g given by (5.3), let us define
gh(t, x, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
zitβ
i
tS
i
t + (−xr
l
tB
l
t + g(t, y + xB
l
t, z))1{x≥0} + (−xr
b
tB
b
t + g(t, y + xB
b
t , z))1{x≤0}
and
gc(t, x, y, z) :=
d∑
i=1
zitβ
i
tS
i
t+(xr
l
tB
l
t−g(t,−y+xB
l
t,−z))1{x≥0}+(xr
b
tB
b
t −g(t,−y+xB
b
t ,−z))1{x≤0}.
The next result is a counterpart of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. In view of the discussion at the
beginning of this subsection, Proposition 5.3 is a rather straightforward consequence of Theorem 4.1
in [14] and thus its proof is omitted.
Proposition 5.3 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Consider an arbitrary
contract (A,C) admissible under P˜β. Then P h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,x1−C and P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,x2−
C where (Y˜ h,x1 , Z˜h,x1) is the unique solution of the BSDE{
dY˜
h,x1
t = Z˜
h,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h(t, x1, Y˜
h,x1
t , Z˜
h,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,x1
T = 0,
(5.7)
and (Y˜ c,x2 , Z˜c,x2) is the unique solution of the BSDE{
dY˜
c,x2
t = Z˜
c,x2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
c(t, x2, Y˜
c,x2
t , Z˜
c,x2
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
c,x2
T = 0,
(5.8)
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Moreover, the unique replicating strategy for the hedger equals ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where for every t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2, . . . , d
ξit = Z˜
h,x1,i
t , ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+, ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C+t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C−t ,
and
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
Y˜
h,x1
t + x1B
l
t1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
t1{x1≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)+
,
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
Y˜
h,x1
t + x1B
l
t1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
t1{x1≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)−
.
The unique replicating strategy for the counterparty equals ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where for every t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, 2, . . . , d
ξit = −Z˜
c,x2,i
t , ψ
i,b
t = −(B
i,b
t )
−1(ξitS
i
t)
+, ηbt = −(B
c,b
t )
−1C−t , η
l
t = (B
c,l
t )
−1C+t .
and
ψlt = (B
l
t)
−1
(
− Y˜ c,x2t + x2B
l
t1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
t1{x2≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)+
,
ψbt = −(B
b
t )
−1
(
− Y˜ c,x2t + x2B
l
t1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
t1{x2≤0} +
∑d
i=1(ξ
i
tS
i
t)
−
)−
.
One can check that gh(t, x, 0, 0) = gc(t, x, 0, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ R. Consider any contract (A,C)
admissible under P˜β . If, in addition, AC is a decreasing process, then for any x1, x2 ∈ R, Y˜
h,x1 ≥ 0
and Y˜ c,x2 ≥ 0, where (Y˜ h,x1 , Z˜h,x1) is the unique solution of BSDE (5.7) and (Y˜ c,x2, Z˜c,x2) is the
unique solution of BSDE (5.8). Consequently, P h(x1, A, C) ≥ −C and P
c(x2,−A,−C) ≥ −C. If
the process AC is increasing, then for any x1, x2 ∈ R we have Y˜
h,x1 ≤ 0 and Y˜ c,x2 ≤ 0, so that
P h(x1, A, C) ≤ −C and P
c(x2,−A,−C) ≤ −C.
Example 5.1 In Example 3.1, we considered a contract (A,C) with At = p1[0,T ](t)+X1[T ](t) and
C = 0. Let us first assume that X ≤ 0; for instance, for a European call option X = −(SiT −K)
+
and for a European put option X = −(K − SiT )
+. Then, obviously, the process AC −A0 = A−A0
is decreasing. Then, for any x ∈ R, both P ht (x,A,C) and P
c
t (x,−A,−C) are positive, meaning that
the hedger is the seller and the counterparty is the buyer. Similarly, if X ≥ 0, for instance, for
a European call option X = (SiT − K)
+ and for European put option X = (K − SiT )
+, then, for
any x ∈ R, both P ht (x,A,C) and P
c
t (x,−A,−C) are negative, meaning that the counterparty is the
seller and the hedger is the buyer. Needless to say that such properties of unilateral options prices
were expected.
5.2.1 General Contracts
Since S˜i,cld, i = 1, 2, . . . , d are (P˜β ,G)-local martingales under Assumption 5.1, we can apply the
comparison theorem to BSDEs (5.7) and (5.8) in order to establish the following proposition (for
the proof, see Section 6).
Proposition 5.4 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Assume that x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤
0 and rb ≤ ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d. Then the following statement are valid.
(i) If x1x2 = 0, then for an arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜
β and all t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s., (5.9)
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
(ii) Let rl and rb be deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then inequality (5.9) holds
for all contracts (A,C) admissible under P˜β and all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if x1x2 = 0.
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Notice that if x1x2 = 0 then, from Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, we know that the desired inequality
holds under respective assumptions. However, in the current proposition, we are working under
Assumption 5.1, so that it is not clear whether the pricing inequality still holds.
Finally, for the case x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≥ 0, one can show show that the following result is valid. The
proof of Proposition 5.5 is similar to that of Proposition 5.4 and thus it is omitted.
Proposition 5.5 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Assume that x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≥
0 and rb ≤ ri,b for i = 1, 2, . . . , d. Then the following statements are valid.
(i) If x1x2 = 0, then for an arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜
β and all t ∈ [0, T ]
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s., (5.10)
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
(ii) Let rl and rb be deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Then inequality (5.10) holds
for all contracts (A,C) admissible under P˜β and all t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if x1x2 = 0.
Remark 5.3 Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.4, one can prove that Propositions 5.1 and
5.2 hold under P˜β, that is, if x1x2 ≥ 0, then for any t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s. (5.11)
Indeed, using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5.4, one can show that
gh(t, x1, y, z)− g
c(t, x2, y, z) ≤
∑d
i=1|z
iSit |
(
(rlt − r
i,b
t )1{x1≥0,x2≥0} + (r
b
t − r
i,b
t )1{x1≤0,x2≤0}
)
≤ 0.
Consequently, using Proposition 5.3 and the comparison theorem for BSDEs, we obtain the desired
inequality (5.11).
5.2.2 Contracts with Monotone Cash Flows
If x1x2 < 0 then, from the proof of Proposition 5.4, we know that for some contracts (A,C) we
have P c
t̂
(x2,−A,−C) ≥ P
h
t̂
(x1, A, C) for some t̂ ∈ [0, T ]. The next theorem show that, for some
special classes of contracts (A,C), the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C) is satisfied for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
Theorem 5.1 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. If x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0, then for an
arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜β and such that the process AC is decreasing on (0, T ]
we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s.,
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
Proof. From Proposition 5.3 and the inequalities x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0, we know that for any contract
(A,C) admissible under P˜β we have P h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,l,x1 − C and P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,b,x2 − C
where (Y˜ h,l,x1 , Z˜h,l,x1) is the unique solution of BSDE (6.2) and (Y˜ c,b,x2, Z˜c,b,x2) is the unique
solution of BSDE (6.3). Since
gh,l(t, x1, 0, 0) = g
c,b(t, x2, 0, 0) = 0,
and AC is a decreasing process then, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs, we have Y˜ h,l,x1 ≥ 0
and Y˜ c,b,x2 ≥ 0. Since x1 ≥ 0, BSDE (5.7) becomes{
dY˜
h,l,x1
t = Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g˜
h,l(t, x1, Y˜
h,l,x1
t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,l,x1
T = 0,
(5.12)
Pricing with Funding Costs and Collateralization 27
where the generator g˜h,l(t, x, y, z) does not depend on x and it is given by (recall that z¯it = z
iSit)
g˜h,l(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
t z¯
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z¯
i
t)
+ + rlty + r
l
t
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−.
Since
gc,b(t, x, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 β
i
t z¯
i
t +
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (−z¯
i
t)
+ + xrbtB
b
t
−rlt
(
− y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−
)+
+ rbt
(
− y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−
)−
≥
∑d
i=1 β
i
t z¯
i
t +
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (−z¯
i
t)
+ + xrbtB
b
t − r
b
t
(
− y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−
)
=
∑d
i=1 β
i
t z¯
i
t +
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (−z¯
i
t)
+ + rbty − r
b
t
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−,
we obtain
g˜h,l(t, x, Y˜ h,l,x1t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t )− g
c,b(t, x, Y˜ h,l,x1t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t )
≤ (rlt − r
b
t )Y˜
h,l,x1
t −
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t |+ r
l
t
∑d
i=1(Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− + rbt
∑d
i=1(−Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
−
= (rlt − r
b
t )Y˜
h,l,x1
t +
∑d
i=1(r
l
t − r
i,b
t )(Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− +
∑d
i=1(r
b
t − r
i,b
t )(−Z˜
h,l,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− ≤ 0.
The comparison theorem for BSDEs gives Y˜ h,l,x1t ≥ Y˜
c,b,x2
t and thus P
c
t (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C),
P˜β-a.s. for every t ∈ [0, T ]. 
Theorem 5.2 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. If x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≥ 0, then for an
arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜β and such that the process AC is increasing on (0, T ]
we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s.,
so that the range of fair bilateral prices Rft (x1, x2) is non-empty almost surely.
Proof. From Proposition 5.3 and x1 ≤ 0, x2 ≥ 0, we know that P
h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,b,x1 − C and
P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,l,x2 − C where (Y˜ h,b,x1 , Z˜h,b,x1) is the unique solution of the following BSDE{
dY˜
h,b,x1
t = Z˜
h,b,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,b(t, x1, Y˜
h,b,x1
t , Z˜
h,b,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,b,x1
T = 0,
(5.13)
where
gh,b(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t − xr
b
tB
b
t + g(t, y + xB
b
t , z).
and (Y˜ c,l,x2 , Z˜c,l,x2) is the unique solution of the following BSDE{
dY˜
c,l,x2
t = Z˜
c,l,x2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
c,l(t, x2, Y˜
c,l,x2
t , Z˜
c,l,x2
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
c,l,x2
T = 0,
(5.14)
where
gc,l(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t + xr
l
tB
l
t − g(t,−y + xB
l
t,−z).
Since
gh,b(t, x1, 0, 0) = g
c,l(t, x2, 0, 0) = 0,
and the process AC is assumed to be increasing, from Theorem 3.3 in [14], we obtain Y˜ h,b,x1 ≤ 0
and Y˜ c,l,x2 ≤ 0. Therefore, since x2 ≥ 0, we see that g
c,l(t, x, y, z) does not depend on x and
gc,l(t, x, y, z) = g˜c,l(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
t z¯
i
t +
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (−z¯
i
t)
+ + rlty − r
l
t
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−
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where, as usual, we denote z¯it = z
iSit . Furthermore, the function g
h,b(t, x, y, z) satisfies
gh,b(t, x, y, z) =
∑d
i=1 β
i
t z¯
i
t −
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z¯
i
t)
+ − xrbtB
b
t
+ rlt
(
y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−
)−
≤
∑d
i=1 z
i
tβ
i
tS
i
t −
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z¯
i
t)
+ − xrbtB
b
t + r
b
t
(
y + xBbt +
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−
)
=
∑d
i=1 β
i
t z¯
i
t −
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t (z¯
i
t)
+ + rbty + r
b
t
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−
and thus
gh,b(t, x, Y˜ h,b,x1t , Z˜
h,b,x1
t )− g˜
c,l(t, x, Y˜ h,b,x1t , Z˜
h,b,x1
t )
≤ (rbt − r
l
t)Y˜
h,b,x1
t −
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |Z˜
h,b,x1,i
t S
i
t |+ r
l
t
∑d
i=1(−Z˜
h,b,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− + rbt
∑d
i=1(Z˜
h,b,x1,i
t S
i
t)
−
= (rbt − r
l
t)Y˜
h,b,x1
t +
∑d
i=1(r
l
t − r
i,b
t )(−Z˜
h,b,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− +
∑d
i=1(r
b
t − r
i,b
t )(Z˜
h,b,x1,i
t S
i
t)
− ≤ 0.
The comparison theorem for BSDEs gives Y˜ h,b,x1 ≥ Y˜ c,l,x2 and thus P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C)
P˜β-a.s., for every t ∈ [0, T ]. 
Remark 5.4 Consider a contract (A,C) such that AC is a decreasing process on (0, T ]. If x1 ≥ 0
then, from the proof of the proposition, we see that P h(x1, A, C) does not depend on the initial
wealth x1, that is, for every x, y ∈ R+ we have P
h(x,A,C) = P h(y,A,C). This follows from the
equality P h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,l,x1 − C, where (Y˜ h,l,x1 , Z˜h,l,x1) is the unique solution of BSDE (5.12),
which is independent of x1. Note that the above relation hinges on the condition x1 ≥ 0. Indeed,
when x1 ≤ 0, then P
h(x1, A, C) does not enjoy the independence property. Furthermore, for any
x2 ∈ R, the price P
c(x2,−A,−C) does not have such property. Finally, for a contract (A,C) such
that AC is an increasing process on (0, T ], if x2 ≥ 0, then P
c(x2,−A,−C) does not depend on the
initial wealth x2, but P
h(x1, A, C) does not have this property.
The above-mentioned property is intuitively clear from its financial interpretation. In essence,
the independence of the hedger’s price of his non-negative positive wealth is a consequence of the
last constraint in equation (2.8), which states that the hedger cannot use his initial endowment to
buy shares for the purpose of hedging. Of course, when he sells shares to replicate an option, as is
the case for the put option, then, obviously, the fact that his initial endowment is positive is also
irrelevant.
Remark 5.5 Assume that x1 > 0 and x2 < 0. We claim that if r
l and rb are deterministic and
satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ], then we can find a date t̂ ∈ [0, T ] and a contract (A,C) with an
increasing process AC such that
P c
t̂
(x2,−A,−C) > P
h
t̂
(x1, A, C), P˜
β − a.s.
To this end, it suffices consider a contract (A,C) with C = 0 and At = p1[0,T ](t)+α1[t0,T ](t) where
t0 ∈ (0, T ), rt ∈ (r
l
t, r
b
t ) for every t ∈ [0, T ] and α satisfies
0 < α ≤ min
{
x1B
l
t0
,−x2B
b
t0
}
.
We set x = x1−α(B
l
t0
)−1 ≥ 0 and we define the strategy ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where ξi = ψi,b = ψb = ηb = ηl = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d and
ψlt = x1[0,t0) + (B
l
t0
)−1
(
xBlt0 + α
)
1[t0,T ].
Then we have
VT (x, ϕ,A,C) = xB
l
T + αe
∫
T
t0
rlu du =
(
x1 − α(B
l
t0
)−1
)
BlT + αe
∫
T
t0
rlu du = x1(B
l
T ) = V
0
T (x1).
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Hence the hedger’s self-financing strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) replicates the contract (A,C) on [0, T ] and,
in fact, this is the unique replicating strategy. From Definition 3.7, it follows that P h0 (x1, A, C) =
x−x1 = −α(B
l
t0
)−1. Let us now consider the contract from the perspective of the counterparty. For
x˜ = x2 + α(B
b
t0
)−1 ≤ 0, we define the strategy ϕ˜ =
(
ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜d, ψ˜l, ψ˜b, ψ˜1,b, . . . , ψ˜d,b, η˜b, η˜l
)
where
ξ˜i = ψ˜i,b = ψ˜l = η˜b = η˜l = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d and
ψ˜bt = x˜1[0,t0) + (B
b
t0
)−1
(
x˜Bbt0 + α
)
1[t0,T ].
Then we have
VT (x˜, ϕ˜, A, C) = x˜B
b
T + αe
∫
T
t0
rbu du = x2B
b
T = V
0
T (x2).
Therefore, the self-financing strategy (x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C) is the unique replicating strategy for the con-
tract (−A,−C) on [0, T ] and, from Definition 3.8, it follows that P c0 (x2,−A,−C) = x2 − x˜ =
−α(Bbt0)
−1. Moreover, since rl < rb and α > 0, we have that
P h0 (x1, A, C) = −α(B
l
t0
)−1 < −α(Bbt0)
−1 = P c0 (x2,−A,−C).
Consequently, under the assumption that rl < rb we have found a contract (A,C) and a date t̂ = 0
such that P c0 (x2,−A,−C) > P
h
0 (x1, A, C). This means that the range of bilaterally profitable prices
Rp0(x1, x2) for (A,C) is non-empty.
5.3 Monotonicity of Prices with Respect to the Initial Endowment
As shown in the preceding subsection, the initial endowment plays an important role in the pricing
inequality. In the following, we examine in more details the impact of the initial endowment on the
ex-dividend price. In view of Remark 5.3, we only need to work under Assumption 5.1.
Proposition 5.6 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid and let a contract (A,C)
be admissible under P˜β. Then the hedger’s price satisfies:
(i) if x¯ ≥ x ≥ 0, then
P ht (x¯, A, C) ≤ P
h
t (x,A,C), (5.15)
(ii) if 0 ≥ x¯ ≥ x, then
P ht (x¯, A, C) ≥ P
h
t (x,A,C), (5.16)
and the counterparty’s price satisfies:
(i) if x¯ ≥ x ≥ 0, then
P ct (x¯,−A,−C) ≥ P
c
t (x,−A,−C), (5.17)
(ii) if 0 ≥ x¯ ≥ x, then
P ct (x¯,−A,−C) ≤ P
c
t (x,−A,−C). (5.18)
Proof. Let us denote
gl,h(x) := −xrltB
l
t + g(t, y + xB
l
t, z), g
b,h(x) := −xrbtB
b
t + g(t, y + xB
b
t , z),
and
gl,c(x) := xrltB
l
t − g(t,−y + xB
l
t,−z), g
b,c(x) := xrbtB
b
t − g(t,−y + xB
b
t ,−z),
where (see (5.3))
g(t, y, z) = −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−
.
If we denote K := y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
− and K˜ := −y +
∑d
i=1(−z
iSit)
−, then
gl,h(x) = −xrltB
l
t + r
l
t(xB
l
t +K)
+ − rbt (xB
l
t +K)
−
= −rlt(xB
l
t +K) + r
l
t(xB
l
t +K)
+ − rbt (xB
l
t +K)
− + rltK
= rlt(xB
l
t +K)
− − rbt (xB
l
t +K)
− + rltK
= (rlt − r
b
t )(xB
l
t +K)
− + rltK
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and
gb,h(x) = −xrbtB
l
t + r
l
t(xB
b
t +K)
+ − rbt (xB
b
t +K)
−
= −rbt (xB
b
t +K) + r
l
t(xB
b
t +K)
+ − rbt (xB
b
t +K)
− + rbtK
= (rlt − r
b
t )(xB
l
t +K)
+ + rbtK.
Similarly,
gl,c(x) = (rbt − r
l
t)(xB
l
t + K˜)
− − rltK˜
and
gb,c(x) = (rbt − r
l
t)(xB
l
t +K)
+ − rbtK.
Therefore, the functions g˜l,h(x) and g˜b,c(x) are increasing with respect to x, whereas the functions
g˜b,h(x) and g˜l,c(x) are decreasing with respect to x. Consequently, from the comparison theorem
for BSDEs, if x¯ ≥ x ≥ 0, then Y˜ h,l,x ≤ Y˜ h,l,x¯ where (Y˜ h,l,x, Z˜h,l,x) is the unique solution of BSDE
(6.2). Moreover, Y˜ c,l,x ≥ Y˜ c,l,x¯ where (Y˜ c,l,x, Z˜c,l,x) is the unique solution of BSDE (5.14). Then
from Remark 5.3, we deduce that (5.15) and (5.17) hold. For 0 ≥ x¯ ≥ x one can show, using similar
arguments, that (5.16) and (5.18) are valid. 
By combining Propositions 5.2–5.6, we obtain the following result, which summarizes the prop-
erties of unilateral prices.
Theorem 5.3 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Then for any contract (A,C)
admissible under P˜β the following statements are valid:
(i) if x¯ ≥ x ≥ 0, then for all t ∈ [0, T ]
P ct (x,−A,−C) ≤ P
c
t (x¯,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x¯, A, C) ≤ P
h
t (x,A,C). (5.19)
(ii) if 0 ≥ x¯ ≥ x, then for all t ∈ [0, T ]
P ht (x¯, A, C) ≥ P
h
t (x,A,C) ≥ P
c
t (x,−A,−C) ≥ P
c
t (x¯,−A,−C). (5.20)
Moreover, if rl and rb are deterministic and satisfy rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ], then for x¯ > 0 > x,
there exists (t̂, A, C) such that
P c
t̂
(x,−A,−C) > P h
t̂
(x¯, A, C) ≥ P c
t̂
(x¯,−A,−C)
and there also exists (t̂, A, C) such that
P h
t̂
(x¯, A, C) ≥ P c
t̂
(x¯,−A,−C) > P h
t̂
(x,A,C).
Corollary 5.1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.6, for any contract (A,C) and any date
t ∈ [0, T ]
P ct (0,−A,−C) ≤ P
c
t (x,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x,A,C) ≤ P
h
t (0, A, C), (5.21)
so that Rft (x, x) ⊂ R
f
t (0, 0).
The above corollary shows that an investor with either a positive or a negative initial endowment
has a potential advantage over an investor with null initial wealth to enter any contract (A,C) at
any time t. This conclusion is plausible, since the borrowing rate is higher than the lending rate.
Indeed, for the same strategy, when an investor who has zero initial endowment needs to borrow
money in order to hedge a contract, an investor with a positive initial endowment may use money
from his initial wealth for the same purpose. Similarly, when an investor with null initial endowment
needs to lend money in order to implement his hedging strategy, an investor with a negative initial
endowment can use instead a surplus of cash to repay his debt. These features create a comparative
advantage.
Using Corollary 5.1 and Proposition 5.6, we can examine the asymptotic properties of P ht (x,A,C)
and P ct (x,−A,−C) when the initial endowment x tends to either ∞ or −∞.
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Proposition 5.7 Let the assumptions of Proposition 5.6 be valid. For any contract (A,C) and
any date t ∈ [0, T ], there exist G-adapted processes, denoted by P h,A,C,+t , P
h,A,C,−
t , P
c,−A,−C,+
t and
P
c,−A,−C,−
t , such that
P
h,A,C,+
t , P
h,A,C,−
t , P
c,−A,−C,+
t , P
c,−A,−C,−
t ∈ [P
c
t (0,−A,−C), P
h
t (0, A, C)] = R
f
0 (0, 0)
and
lim
x→+∞
P ht (x,A,C) = P
h,A,C,+
t ≥ P
c,−A,−C,+
t = lim
x→+∞
P ct (x,−A,−C),
lim
x→−∞
P ht (x,A,C) = P
h,A,C,−
t ≥ P
c,−A,−C,−
t = lim
x→−∞
P ct (x,−A,−C).
Proof. The statement easily follows from Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 5.1. 
We can only have P h,A,C,+t ≥ P
c,A,C,+
t and P
h,A,C,−
t ≥ P
c,A,C,−
t . Other comparison results
between these four processes are still unclear. Indeed, if rl and rb are deterministic and such that
rlt < r
b
t for every t ∈ [0, T ], then there exists (t̂, A, C) such that
P
h,A,C,+
t̂
≥ P c,A,C,+
t̂
> P
h,A,C,−
t̂
≥ P c,A,C,−
t̂
,
as well as there exists (t̂, A, C) such that
P
h,A,C,−
t̂
≥ P c,A,C,−
t̂
> P
h,A,C,+
t̂
≥ P c,A,C,+
t̂
.
Now, we consider a special case of a contract (A,C) and t ∈ [0, T ] such that
P
h,A,C
t := min
{
P
h,A,C,+
t , P
h,A,C,−
t
}
≥ max
{
P
c,−A,−C,+
t , P
c,−A,−C,−
t
}
=: P c,−A,−Ct .
Then
[
P
c,−A,−C
t , P
h,A,C
t
]
is the bilateral fair pricing range for all investors with identical, but oth-
erwise arbitrary, initial endowment, meaning that[
P
c,−A,−C
t , P
h,A,C
t
]
=
⋂
x∈R
[P ct (x,−A,−C), P
h
t (x,A,C)] =
⋂
x∈R
Rft (x, x).
The following stability of unilateral ex-dividend prices with respect to the initial endowment
can also be established using Proposition 3.1 in [14]. For the reader’s convenience, we recall two
alternative versions of the Lipschitz condition, which were employed in [14] (see Definitions 2.1 and
3.1 in [14]). Let h : Ω× [0, T ]×R×Rd → R be a G ⊗B([0, T ])⊗B(R)⊗B(Rd)-measurable function
such that h(·, ·, y, z) is a G-adapted process for any fixed (y, z) ∈ R× Rd, and let m be the process
introduced in either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2.
Definition 5.2 We say that h satisfies the uniform Lipschitz condition if there exists a constant L
such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y1, y2 ∈ R, z1, z2 ∈ R
d,
|h(t, y1, z1)− h(t, y2, z2)| ≤ L (|y1 − y2|+ ‖z1 − z2‖) , P− a.s. (5.22)
We say that h satisfies the m-Lipschitz condition if there exist two strictly positive and G-adapted
processes ρ and θ such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y1, y2 ∈ R, z1, z2 ∈ R
d,
|h(t, y1, z1)− h(t, y2, z2)| ≤ ρt|y1 − y2|+ θt‖m
∗
t (z1 − z2)‖. (5.23)
Theorem 5.4 Let either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Then for any contract (A,C)
admissible under P˜β, there exists a constant K0 such that
EP
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|P ht (x1, A, C)− P
h
t (x2, A, C)|+ sup
t∈[0,T ]
|P ct (x1,−A,−C)− P
c
t (x2,−A,−C)|
]
≤ K0|x1−x2|.
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Proof. From Remark 5.3, we have P ht (xi, A, C) = Y˜
h,xi
t −Ct for every t ∈ [0, T ), where (Y˜
h,xi , Z˜h,xi)
is the solution of the following BSDE{
dY˜
h,xi
t = Z˜
h,xi,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h(t, xi, Y˜
h,xi
t , Z˜
h,xi,∗
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,xi
T = 0,
(5.24)
where
gh(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
tz
i
tS
i
t +
(
g(t, y + xBlt, z)− xr
l
tB
l
t
)
1{x≥0} +
(
g(t, y + xBbt , z)− xr
b
tB
b
t
)
1{x≤0}.
It is not hard to check that if x1x2 ≥ 0, then there exists a constant K, which only depends on the
bound for rl and rb, such that
|gh(t, x1, y, z)− g
h(t, x2, y, z)| ≤ K|x1 − x2|.
Consequently, if x1x2 < 0, then
|gh(t, x1, y, z)− g
h(t, x2, y, z)| ≤ |g
h(t, x1, y, z)− g
h(t, 0, y, z)|+ |gh(t, 0, y, z)− gh(t, x2, y, z)|
≤ K|x1|+K|x2| = K|x1 − x2|.
We conclude that there exists a constant K, which depends only on the bound for rl and rb, such
that
|gh(t, x1, y, z)− g
h(t, x2, y, z)| ≤ K|x1 − x2|, for all x1, x2 ∈ R.
Under Assumption 5.1 (resp., Assumption 5.2), for a fixed x ∈ R, gh(t, x, y, z) satisfies (5.23) with
ρ = θ = L̂, where a constant L̂ depends on the bound for rl, rb, ri,b and Si for i = 1, 2, . . . , d, as well
as the lower bound for |m| (resp., a constant L̂ depends on the bound rl, rb and ri,b). Consequently,
there always exists a constant L̂, such that the driver satisfies the Lipschitz condition (5.23) with
processes ρ = θ = L̂. Consequently, as in Section 3.2 in [14], we deduce that the spaces Ĥ2λ and Ĥ
2
0,
(resp., the spaces L̂2λ and L̂
2
0) may be identified, since the related norms are equivalent. Moreover,
one can check α−1gh(t, x, 0, 0) ∈ Ĥ20.
By an application of Proposition 3.2 in [14], there exists a constant K0 such that
EP
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|P ht (x1, A, C)− P
h
t (x2, A, C)|
2
]
= EP
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Y˜ h,x1t − Y˜
h,x2
t |
2
]
≤ K0
∣∣∣α−1gh(t, x1, Y˜ h,x2t −ACt , Z˜h,x2t )− α−1gh(t, x2, Y˜ h,x2t −ACt , Z˜h,x2t )∣∣∣2
Ĥ2
0
≤ K0|x1 − x2|
2.
Similarly, one can check that the same inequality holds for the counterparty’s price. 
5.4 Price Independence of the Initial Endowment
We will now show that for a certain class of contracts the price is independent of the initial en-
dowment. It is worth noting that an analogous result does not hold in Bergman’s model studied in
[15].
Proposition 5.8 Let x1 ≥ 0 and either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Consider an
arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜β. If the process AC −AC0 is decreasing, then the price
P ht (x1, A, C) is independent of x1, so that P
h
t (x1, A, C) = P
h
t (0, A, C) for all x1 ≥ 0.
Proof. Since x1 ≥ 0, it follows from Proposition 5.3 that the hedger’s price of any contract (A,C)
admissible under P˜β satisfies P ht (x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,l,x1
t −Ct where (Y˜
h,l,x1 , Z˜h,l,x1) is the unique solution
of the following BSDE{
dY˜
h,l,x1
t = Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,l(t, x1, Y˜
h,l,x1
t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,l,x1
T = 0,
(5.25)
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where
gh,l(t, x1, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
tz
iSit − x1r
l
tB
l
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+
+ rlt
(
y + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−
.
Since gh,l(t, x1, 0, 0) = 0 and the process A
C − AC0 is decreasing, we deduce from the comparison
theorem for BSDEs (see, for instance, Theorem 3.3 in [14] with U1 = AC − AC0 and U
2 = 0) that
Y˜ h,l,x1 ≥ 0. Since x1 ≥ 0, BSDE (5.25) can thus be represented as follows{
dY˜
h,l,x1
t = Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g˜
h,l(t, x1, Y˜
h,l,x1
t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,l,x1
T = 0,
(5.26)
where the generator g˜h,l(t, x1, y, z) is independent of x1 and equals (recall that z¯
i
t = z
iSit)
g˜h,l(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
t z¯
i
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z¯
i
t)
+ + rlty + r
l
t
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−.
Obviously, the unique solution to BSDE (5.26) is independent of x1 and thus the price P
h
t (x1, A, C) =
Y˜
h,l,x1
t − Ct enjoys the same property. 
5.5 Positive Homogeneity of the Hedger’s Price
We consider once again the hedger’s price and we show that it is positively homogeneous with respect
to the size of the contract and the non-negative initial endowment. Observe that this property is no
longer true if only the size of the contract (but not the initial endowment) is scaled by a non-negative
number λ (of course, unless the price is independent of the initial endowment, as in Proposition 5.8).
Proposition 5.9 Let x1 ≥ 0 and either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 be valid. Consider an
arbitrary contract (A,C) admissible under P˜β. If the process C ∈ Ĥ20, then for all λ ∈ R+
P ht (λx1, λA, λC) = λP
h
t (x1, A, C). (5.27)
Proof. It is obvious that (5.27) holds for λ = 0. Suppose that λ > 0. Once again, from Proposition
5.3, we know that P h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,l,x1−C where (Y˜ h,l,x1 , Z˜h,l,x1) is the unique solution to (5.25).
Moreover, P h(λx1, λA, λC) = Y˜
h,l,λx1 − λC where (Y˜ h,l,λx1 , Z˜h,l,λx1) is the unique solution of the
following BSDE{
dY˜
h,l,λx1
t = Z˜
h,l,λx1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,l(t, λx1, Y˜
h,l,λx1
t , Z˜
h,l,λx1
t ) dt+ λdA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,l,λx1
T = 0.
Recall that AC = A+C+FC where FCt := −
∫ t
0
rcuCu du. Then P
h(x1, A, C) = Y
1 where (Y 1, Z1) is
the unique solution of the following BSDE (since (A,C) is admissible and C ∈ Ĥ20, the well-posedness
of this BSDE is easy to check){
dY 1t = Z
1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,l(t, x1, Y
1
t + Ct, Z
1
t ) dt+ d(At + F
C
t ),
Y 1T = 0.
Similarly, P h(λx1, λA, λC) = Y
2 where (Y 2, Z2) is the unique solution of the following BSDE{
dY 2t = Z
2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,l(t, λx1, Y
2
t + λCt, Z
2
t ) dt+ λd(At + F
C
t ),
Y 2T = 0.
(5.28)
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For Y := λY 1 and Z = λZ1, we have{
dYt = Z
∗
t dS˜
cld
t + λg
h,l(t, x1, λ
−1Yt + Ct, λ
−1Zt) dt+ λd(At + F
C
t ),
YT = 0.
(5.29)
Hence to complete the proof, it suffices to observe that the equality
λgh,l(t, x1, λ
−1y + Ct, λ
−1z) = gh,l(t, λx1, y + λCt, z)
is satisfied for all λ > 0. 
5.6 European Claims and Related Pricing PDEs
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that d = 1, so that there is only one risky asset S = S1.
It is clear, however, that the results obtained in this subsection can be easily extended to a multi-
asset case. Moreover, we postulate that the interest rates rl and rb are deterministic. We examine
valuation and hedging of an uncollateralized European contingent claim starting from a fixed time
t ∈ [0, T ], that is, we set C = 0. A generic path-independent claim of European style pays a single
cash flow H(ST ) on the expiration date T > 0, so that
At −A0 = −H(ST )1[T,T ](t).
For any fixed t < T , the risky asset S has the ex-dividend price dynamics under P given by the
following expression, for u ∈ [t, T ],
dSu = µ(u, Su) du+ σ(u, Su) dWu, St = s ∈ O, (5.30)
whereW is a one-dimensional Brownian motion andO is the domain of real values that are attainable
by the diffusion process S (usually O = R+). Moreover, the coefficients µ and σ are such that SDE
(5.30) has a unique strong solution. We also assume that the volatility coefficient σ is bounded and
bounded away from zero. Finally, the dividend process equals A1t =
∫ t
0 κ(u, Su) du.
Our first goal is to derive the hedger’s pricing PDE for a path-independent European claim. We
observe that
dS˜cldu = dSu + dA
1
u − β(u, Su) du =
(
µ(u, Su) + κ(u, Su)− β(u, Su)
)
du+ σ(u, Su) dWu.
From the Girsanov theorem, if we denote
au := (σ(u, Su))
−1
(
µ(u, Su) + κ(u, Su)− β(u, Su)
)
and define the probability measure P˜ as
dP˜
dP
= exp
{
−
∫ T
t
au dWu −
1
2
∫ T
t
|au|
2 du
}
,
then P˜ is equivalent to P and the process W˜ is the Brownian motion under P˜, where dW˜u :=
dWu + au du. It is easy to see that
dS˜cldu = σ(u, Su) dW˜u
and thus we conclude that S˜cld is a (P˜,G)-martingale and 〈S˜cld〉u =
∫ u
t
|σ(v, Sv)|
2 dv. Therefore,
either Assumption 5.1 or Assumption 5.2 holds, provided that we assume that the Brownian motion
W˜ has the PRP under (G, P˜). Of course, the latter assumption is not restrictive in the present
set-up.
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Since A has only a single cash flow at time T and C = 0, we deduce from Proposition 5.3
that, for any initial endowment x1 ∈ R, the hedger’s prices satisfies P
h(x1, A, C) = Y˜
h,x1 , where
(Y˜ h,x1 , Z˜h,x1) is the unique solution of following BSDE driven by the Brownian motion W˜{
dY˜ h,x1u = Z˜
h,x1
u σ(u, Su) dW˜u + g
h(u, x1, Su, Y˜
h,x1
u , Z˜
h,x1
u ) du,
Y˜
h,x1
T = H(ST ),
(5.31)
where for x1 ≥ 0
gh(u, x1, s, y, z) := zβ(u, s)−x1r
l
uB
l
t− r
1,b
u (zs)
++ rlu
(
y+x1B
l
u+(zs)
−
)+
− rbu
(
y+x1B
l
u+(zs)
−
)−
and for x1 ≤ 0
gh(u, x1, s, y, z) := zβ(u, s)−x1r
b
uB
b
u−r
1,b
u (zs)
++rlu
(
y+x1B
b
u+(zs)
−
)+
−rbu
(
y+x1B
b
u+(zs)
−
)−
.
The well-posedness of BSDE (5.31) is well known under mild assumptions, since we assumed that W˜
has the PRP under (G, P˜). The unique replicating strategy for the hedger equals ϕ =
(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
where ξu = Z˜
h,x1
u , ψ
1,b
u = −(B
1,b
u )
−1(ξuSu)
+ and
ψlu = (B
l
u)
−1
(
Y˜ h,x1u + x1B
l
u1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
u1{x1≤0} + (ξuSu)
−
)+
,
ψbu = −(B
b
u)
−1
(
Y˜ h,x1u + x1B
l
u1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
u1{x1≤0} + (ξuSu)
−
)−
.
In the next step, we fix a date t ∈ [0, T ) and we assume that Ss,tt = s ∈ O. Note that under P˜,
for all u ∈ [t, T ],
dSs,tu = (β(u, S
s,t
u )− κ(u, S
s,t
u )) du + σ(u, S
s,t
u ) dW˜u.
It is clear that the solution (Y˜ h,x1 , Z˜h,x1) will now depend on the initial value s at time t of
the stock price; to emphasize this feature, we write (Y˜ h,x1,s, Z˜h,x1,s). Furthermore, if we set
(Y h,x1,su , Z
h,x1,s
u ) := (Y˜
h,x1,s
u , Z˜
h,x1,s
u σ(u, S
s,t
u )) and
gh(u, x1, s, y, z) = g
h(u, x1, s, y, zσ
−1(u, s)),
then BSDE (5.31) yields{
dY h,x1,su = Z
h,x1,s
u dW˜u + g
h(u, x1, S
s,t
u , Y
h,x1,s
u , Z
h,x1,s
u ) du,
Y
h,x1,s
T = H(S
s,t
T ).
(5.32)
Using the non-linear Feynman-Kac formula (see [17, 18]), we argue that under suitable smooth-
ness conditions imposed on the coefficients µ, σ, κ and β, the hedger’s pricing function v(t, s) :=
Y
h,x1,s
t belongs to the class C
1,2([0, T ]×O) and solves the following pricing PDE{
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + Lv(t, s) = gh
(
t, x1, s, v(t, s), σ(t, s)
∂v
∂s
)
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O,
(5.33)
where the differential operator L is given by the following expression
L :=
1
2
σ2(t, s)
∂2
∂s2
+ (β − κ)(t, s)
∂
∂s
.
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In view of the definition of gh, it is clear that PDE (5.33) is in turn equivalent to
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + 12σ
2(t, s)∂
2v
∂s2
(t, s) = κ(t, s)∂v
∂s
(t, s)− x1r
l
tB
l
t1{x1≥0} − x1r
b
tB
b
t1{x1≤0} − r
1,b
t
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)+
+ rlt
(
v(t, s) + x1B
l
t1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
t1{x1≤0} +
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)−)+
− rbt
(
v(t, s) + x1B
l
t1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
t1{x1≤0} +
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)−)−
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O.
(5.34)
Remark 5.6 It is worth stressing that the coefficient β does not appear in the pricing PDE (5.34).
Therefore, in order to derive the PDE, β can be chosen arbitrarily, except for constraint ensuring that
the model is arbitrage-free (see Proposition 3.2). Consequently, without changing the probability
measure (i.e., by choosing β such at = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]), we can still derive PDE (5.34).
Conversely, if v ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×O) solves PDE (5.34), then the pair (v(u, Su), σ(u, Su)
∂v
∂s
(u, Su))
solves BSDE (5.32) on u ∈ [t, T ] where, for brevity, we write S = Ss,t. From the above discussions,
(v(u, Su),
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)) is also a solution to BSDE (5.31) on u ∈ [t, T ] for an arbitrary initial stock price
St = s. Consequently, the unique replicating strategy for the hedger equals ϕ =
(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
where, for all u ∈ [t, T ],
ξu =
∂v
∂s
(u, Su), ψ
1,b
t = −(B
1,b
u )
−1
(
Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)
)+
,
ψlu = (B
l
u)
−1
(
v(u, Su) + x1B
l
u1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
u1{x1≤0} +
(
Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)
)−)+
,
ψbu = −(B
b
u)
−1
(
v(u, Su) + x1B
l
u1{x1≥0} + x1B
b
u1{x1≤0} +
(
Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)
)−)−
.
(5.35)
Let us now focus on the pricing PDE for the counterparty. Recall that P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,x2 ,
where (Y˜ c,x2 , Z˜c,x2) is the unique solution to the following BSDE{
dY˜ c,x2u = Z˜
c,x2
u σ(u, Su) dW˜u + g
c(u, x2, Su, Y˜
c,x2
u , Z˜
c,x2
u ) du,
Y˜
c,x2
T = H(S
s,t
T ),
(5.36)
where for x1 ≥ 0,
gc(u, x2, s, y, z) := zβ(u, s)+x2r
l
uB
l
u+r
1,b
u (zs)
+−rlu
(
−y+x2B
l
u+(−zs)
−
)+
+rbu
(
−y+x2B
l
u+(−zs)
−
)−
and for x1 ≤ 0
gc(u, x2, s, y, z) := zβ(u, s)+x2r
b
uB
b
u+r
1,b
u (zs)
+−rlu
(
−y+x2B
b
u+(−zs)
−
)+
+rbu
(
−y+x2B
b
u+(−zs)
−
)−
.
The unique replicating strategy for the counterparty equals ϕ =
(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
where ξu = −Z˜
c,x2
u ,
ψ1,bu = −(B
1,b
u )
−1(ξuSu)
+ and
ψlu = (B
l
u)
−1
(
− Y˜ h,x2u + x2B
l
u1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
u1{x2≤0} + (ξuSu)
−
)+
,
ψbu = −(B
b
u)
−1
(
− Y˜ h,x2u + x2B
l
u1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
u1{x2≤0} + (ξuSu)
−
)−
.
For a fixed (t, s) ∈ [0, T )×O, we denote (Y c,x2,su , Z
c,x2,s
u ) := (Y˜
c,x2,s
u , Z˜
c,x2,s
u σ(u, S
s,t
u )) and
gc(u, x2, s, y, z) = g
c(u, x2, s, y, zσ
−1(u, s)).
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Then BSDE (5.36) becomes{
dY c,x2,su = Z
c,x2,s
u dW˜u + g
c(u, x2, S
s,t
u , Y
c,x2,s
u , Z
c,x2,s
u ) du,
Y
c,x2,s
T = H(S
s,t
T ).
(5.37)
Using the same argument as for the hedger, we deduce that the pricing function v(t, s) := Y c,x2,st
belongs to C1,2([0, T ]×O) and solves the following PDE{
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + Lv(t, s) = gc
(
t, x2, s, v(t, s), σ(t, s)
∂v
∂s
)
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O,
(5.38)
or, more explicitly,
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + 12σ
2(t, s)∂
2v
∂s2
(t, s) = κ(t, s)∂v
∂s
(t, s) + x2r
l
tB
l
t1{x2≥0} + x2r
b
tB
b
t1{x2≤0} + r
1,b
t
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)+
− rlt
(
− v(t, s) + x2B
l
t1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
t1{x2≤0} +
(
− s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)−)+
+ rbt
(
− v(t, s) + x2B
l
t1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
t1{x2≤0} +
(
− s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)−)−
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O.
(5.39)
Conversely, if a function v ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×O) solves PDE (5.39), then (v(u, Su), σ(u, Su)
∂v
∂s
(u, Su))
solves BSDE (5.37) on u ∈ [t, T ] where we write S = Ss,t. Consequently, the pair (v(u, Su),
∂v
∂s
(u, Su))
solves BSDE (5.36). Consequently, the unique replicating strategy for the hedger equals ϕ =(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
where, for every u ∈ [t, T ],
ξu = −
∂v
∂s
(u, Su), ψ
1,b
u = −(B
1,b
u )
−1(−Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su))
+,
ψlu = (B
l
u)
−1
(
− v(u, Su) + x2B
l
u1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
u1{x2≤0} +
(
− Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)
)−)+
,
ψbu = −(B
b
u)
−1
(
− v(u, Su) + x2B
l
u1{x2≥0} + x2B
b
u1{x2≤0} +
(
− Su
∂v
∂s
(u, Su)
)−)−
.
(5.40)
In summary, we are in a position to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 5.10 Let v(t, s) ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×O) be the solution of quasi-linear PDE (5.34). Then
the hedger’s ex-dividend price of the European contingent claim H(ST ) is given by v(t, St) and
the unique replicating strategy ϕ =
(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
for the hedger is given by (5.35). Similarly,
if v(t, s) ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × O) is the solution of quasi-linear PDE (5.39), then the counterparty’s ex-
dividend price of the European contingent claim H(ST ) is given by v(t, St) and the unique replicating
strategy ϕ =
(
ξ, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b
)
for the counterparty is given by (5.40).
If smoothness of model coefficients is not postulated then, from Theorem 4.3 in Peng [17], the
function v(t, s) := Y h,x1,st (resp., v(t, s) := Y
c,x2,s
t ) is known to be the unique viscosity solution of
PDE (5.34) (resp., (5.39)).
We notice that PDE (5.34) depends on the initial endowment x1. In the special case where
rl = rb = r, equation (5.34) reduces to the following PDE independent of x1
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + 12σ
2(t, s)∂
2v
∂s2
(t, s) = κ(t, s)∂v
∂s
(t, s)− r1,bt
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)+
+ rt
(
v(t, s) +
(
s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)−)
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O.
(5.41)
Note that PDE (5.41) can characterize the price and the strategy for the European contingent claim
in the case where the borrowing rate and the lending rates are equal.
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If we assume, in addition, that ri,b = r, then PDE (5.41) becomes
∂v
∂t
(t, s) + 12σ
2(t, s)∂
2v
∂s2
(t, s) = κ(t, s)∂v
∂s
(t, s)
+ rt
(
v(t, s)− s∂v
∂s
(t, s)
)
, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ]×O,
v(T, s) = H(s), s ∈ O.
(5.42)
We observe that PDE (5.42) is nothing else but the classic Black and Scholes PDE. We mentioned
in Example 3.1 that the market model partial netting does not cover the standard case of different
borrowing and lending rates when ri,b = rb > rl and trading is assumed to be unrestricted. However,
when the equalities ri,b = rb = rl are postulated, then the related PDEs for the European contingent
claim are identical so, as expected, the prices and hedging strategies coincide as well.
Without using the BSDEs method, one can still obtain Proposition 5.10 by applying the classical
arguments, as was done, for instance, in [1]. Both methods essentially hinge on the same tool, the
non-linear Feynman-Kac formula. We mention that when the solution of the related PDE is not
smooth, then the BSDE approach gives a probabilistic representation for the viscosity solution of
the PDE.
Remark 5.7 In the related paper [15], we also revisit the market model studied by Bergman [1]
and we extend his analysis by considering a general contract (A,C), rather than path-independent
European claims, and investors with non-zero initial endowments. In this model, the funding ac-
counts for risky assets are not introduced and thus the last constraint in (2.8) is relaxed. Hence
the hedger can use his initial endowment to buy shares for the purpose of hedging. Consequently,
for each particular set-up, the properties of prices will be quite different, but most of them can
be deduced from the general results for the auxiliary BSDEs. We also derive the pricing PDE for
path-independent European claims in a Markovian framework.
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6 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 5.2 and 5.4
6.1 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof of Proposition 5.2. We assume that x1 ≤ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, we
know that P h(x1, A, C) = B
b(Y h,b,x1 − x1) − C where (Y
h,b,x1 , Zh,b,x1) is the unique solution of
BSDE (4.8) and P c(x2,−A,−C) = −(B
b(Y c,b,x2 − x2) + C) where (Y
c,b,x2 , Zc,b,x2) is the unique
solution of BSDE (4.12). As in the proof of Proposition 5.1, to establish (5.2), it suffices to check
that Y¯ c,b,x2 ≤ Y¯ h,b,x1 where (Y¯ h,b,x1, Z¯h,b,x1) is the unique solution to the following BSDE{
dY¯
h,b,x1
t = Z¯
h,b,x1,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t + f˜b
(
t, Y¯
h,b,x1
t + x1, Z¯
h,b,x1
t
)
dt+ (Bbt )
−1 dACt ,
Y¯
h,b,x1
T = 0,
and (Y¯ c,b,x2 , Z¯c,b,x2) is the unique solution to the BSDE{
dY¯
c,b,x2
t = Z¯
c,b,x2,∗
t dS˜
b,cld
t − f˜b
(
t,−Y¯ c,b,x2t + x2,−Z¯
c,b,x2
t
)
dt+ (Bbt )
−1 dACt ,
Y¯
c,b,x2
T = 0.
To apply Theorem 3.3 in [14], we need to prove that either
−f˜b
(
t, Y¯
h,b,x1
t + x1, Z¯
h,b,x1
t
)
≥ f˜b
(
t,−Y¯ h,b,x1t + x2,−Z¯
h,b,x1
t
)
, P˜b ⊗ ℓ− a.e.
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or
−f˜b
(
t, Y¯
c,b,x2
t + x1, Z¯
c,b,x2
t
)
≥ f˜b
(
t,−Y¯ c,b,x2t + x2,−Z¯
c,b,x2
t
)
, P˜b ⊗ ℓ− a.e.
To establish these inequalities, it suffices to use Lemma 6.1. We conclude that inequality (5.2) is
valid. 
Lemma 6.1 Assume that x1 ≤ 0 and x2 ≤ 0. Then the mapping f˜b : Ω× [0, T ]×R×R
d→ R given
by equation (2.17) satisfies
− f˜b
(
t, y + x1, z
)
≥ f˜b
(
t,−y + x2,−z
)
, for all (y, z) ∈ R× Rd, P˜b ⊗ ℓ− a.e. (6.1)
Proof. Recall that, for all (y, z) ∈ R× Rd,
f˜b(t, y, z) := (B
b
t )
−1fb(t, B
b
ty, z)− r
b
ty
where
fb(t, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1r
b
tz
iSit −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(ẑ
i
t)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(ẑ
i
t)
−
)−
.
We now denote ẑit = (B
b
t )
−1ziSit . Then
δ := f˜b
(
t, y + x1, z
)
+ f˜b
(
t,−y + x2,−z
)
= −rbt (y + x1) + (B
b
t )
−1fb(t, B
b
t (y + x1), z)− r
b
t (−y + xz) + (B
b
t )
−1fb(t, B
b
t (−y + x2),−z)
= −rbt (x1 + x2)−
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |ẑ
i
t|+ r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
where
δ1 := y + x1 +
∑d
i=1(ẑ
i
t)
−, δ2 := −y + x2 +
∑d
i=1(−ẑ
i
t)
−.
Since rl ≤ rb, we have
δ = −rbt (x1 + x2)−
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |ẑ
i
t|+ r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
≤ −rbt (x1 + x2)−
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |ẑ
i
t|+ r
b
t (δ1 + δ2)
= −rbt (x1 + x2)−
∑d
i=1 r
i,b
t |ẑ
i
t|+ r
b
t (x1 + x2 +
∑d
i=1|ẑ
i
t|)
=
∑d
i=1(r
b
t − r
i,b
t )|ẑ
i
t| ≤ 0.
Thus inequality (6.1) holds. 
6.2 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof of part (i) in Proposition 5.4. We first prove that if the initial endowments satisfy x1x2 = 0,
then the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C) holds for any contract (A,C). From Proposition
5.3, if x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≤ 0, then for any contract (A,C) admissible under P˜ we have P
h(x1, A, C) =
Y˜ h,l,x1 − C and P c(x2,−A,−C) = Y˜
c,b,x2 − C where (Y˜ h,l,x1 , Z˜h,l,x1) is the unique solution of the
following BSDE {
dY˜
h,l,x1
t = Z˜
h,l,x1,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
h,l(t, x1, Y˜
h,l,x1
t , Z˜
h,l,x1
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
h,l,x1
T = 0,
(6.2)
and (Y˜ c,b,x2 , Z˜c,b,x2) is the unique solution of the following BSDE{
dY˜
c,b,x2
t = Z˜
c,b,x2,∗
t dS˜
cld
t + g
c,b(t, x2, Y˜
c,b,x2
t , Z˜
c,b,x2
t ) dt+ dA
C
t ,
Y˜
c,b,x2
T = 0,
(6.3)
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where the generators are given by
gh,l(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
tz
iSit − xr
l
tB
l
t + g(t, y + xB
l
t, z)
and
gc,b(t, x, y, z) :=
∑d
i=1β
i
tz
iSit + xr
b
tB
b
t − g(t,−y + xB
b
t ,−z)
where in turn (see (5.3)))
g(t, y, z) = −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t (z
iSit)
+ + rlt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)+
− rbt
(
y +
∑d
i=1(z
iSit)
−
)−
. (6.4)
Let us denote z¯it = z
iSit . To apply Theorem 3.3 in [14], it suffices to show that
−
∑d
i=1β
i
t z¯
i
t + x1r
l
tB
l
t − g(t, y + x1B
l
t, z) ≥ −
∑d
i=1β
i
t z¯
i
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t + g(t,−y + x2B
b
t ,−z),
which is equivalent to
δ := g(t, y + x1B
l
t, z) + g(t,−y + x2B
b
t ,−z)− x1r
l
tB
l
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t ≤ 0.
In view of Lemma 6.2, we conclude that the inequality P ct (x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t (x1, A, C) holds for
every t ∈ [0, T ]. 
Proof of part (ii) in Proposition 5.4. We now assume that rl and rb are deterministic and satisfy
rlt < r
b
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Assume that x1x2 6= 0, that is, x1 > 0 and x2 < 0. Our goal is to find a
contract (A,C) and a date t̂ ∈ [0, T ] such that the inequality P c
t̂
(x2,−A,−C) ≤ P
h
t̂
(x1, A, C) fails
to hold. To this end, we consider a contract with C = 0 and
At = p1[0,T ](t)− α1[t0,T ](t) + αe
∫
T
t0
ru du1[T ](t),
where t0 ∈ (0, T ) and the function r satisfies ru ∈ (r
l
u, r
b
u) for all u ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, a constant
α > 0 is such that
x1B
l
t0
− αe
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
l
u) du ≥ 0, x1 + α(B
l
t0
)−1 − α(BlT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du ≥ 0,
x2B
b
t0
+ αe
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
b
u) du ≤ 0, x2 − α(B
b
t0
)−1 + α(BbT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du ≤ 0,
which in turn is equivalent to: α > 0 and
x2κ
−1
2 ≤ α ≤ min
{
x1B
l
t0
e
−
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
l
u) du, −x2B
b
t0
e
−
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
b
u) du, x1κ
−1
1
}
(6.5)
where
κ1 := −(B
l
t0
)−1 + (BlT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du, κ2 := (B
b
t0
)−1 + (BbT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du.
Note that κ1 > 0 and κ2 > 0 since from r
l < r < rb, we obtain
−
∫ t0
0
rlu du−
(∫ T
t0
ru du −
∫ T
0
rlu du
)
= −
∫ T
t0
(ru − r
l
u) du < 0.
and
−
∫ t0
0
rbu du−
(∫ T
t0
ru du −
∫ T
0
rbu du
)
= −
∫ T
t0
(ru − r
b
u) du > 0,
Therefore, a constant α > 0 satisfying (6.5) exists and for
x := x1 + α(B
l
t0
)−1 − α(BlT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du ≥ 0,
we obtain
xBlt0 − α = x1B
l
t0
− αe
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
l
u) du ≥ 0.
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Now we define the strategy ϕ =
(
ξ1, . . . , ξd, ψl, ψb, ψ1,b, . . . , ψd,b, ηb, ηl
)
where ξi = ψi,b = ψb = ηb =
ηl = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , d and
ψlt = x1[0,t0) + (B
l
t0
)−1
(
xBlt0 − α
)
1[t0,T ) + (B
l
T )
−1
(
xBlT − αe
∫
T
t0
rlu du + αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
)
1[T,T ].
The wealth process satisfies
VT (x, ϕ,A,C) =
(
xBlt0 − α
)
e
∫
T
t0
rlu du + αe
∫
T
t0
ru du = xBlT − αe
∫
T
t0
rlu du + αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
=
(
x1 + α(B
l
t0
)−1 − α(BlT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du
)
BlT − αe
∫
T
t0
rlu du + αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
= x1B
l
T = V
0
T (x1).
Therefore, the self-financing strategy (x, ϕ,A,C) replicates the contract (A,C) on [0, T ]. Moreover
from the uniqueness of the related pricing BSDE, we know that this is the unique strategy. From
Definition 3.7, it follows that
P h0 (x1, A, C) = x− x1 = α(B
l
t0
)−1 − α(BlT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du = −ακ1 < 0.
Let us now focus on the counterparty. If we set
x˜ = x2 − α(B
b
t0
)−1 + α(BbT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du ≤ 0,
then we obtain
x˜Bbt0 + α = x2B
b
t0
+ αe
∫
T
t0
(ru−r
b
u) du ≤ 0.
We define the strategy ϕ˜ =
(
ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜d, ψ˜l, ψ˜b, ψ˜1,b, . . . , ψ˜d,b, η˜b, η˜l
)
where ξ˜i = ψ˜i,b = ψ˜l = η˜b =
η˜l = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , d and
ψ˜bt = x˜1[0,t0) + (B
b
t0
)−1
(
x˜Bbt0 + α
)
1[t0,T ) + (B
b
T )
−1
(
x˜BbT + αe
∫
T
t0
rbu du − αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
)
1[T,T ].
Then we have
VT (x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C) =
(
x˜Bbt0 + α
)
e
∫
T
t0
rbu du − αe
∫
T
t0
ru du = x˜BbT + αe
∫
T
t0
rbu du − αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
=
(
x2 − α(B
b
t0
)−1 + α(BbT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du
)
BbT + αe
∫
T
t0
rbu du − αe
∫
T
t0
ru du
= x2B
b
T = V
0
T (x2).
Hence (x˜, ϕ˜,−A,−C) is the unique self-financing strategy replicating the contract (−A,−C) on
[0, T ]. From Definition 3.8, it follows that
P c0 (x2,−A,−C) = x2 − x˜ = α(B
b
t0
)−1 − α(BbT )
−1e
∫
T
t0
ru du = ακ2 > 0.
We have thus found a date t̂ = 0 and a contract (A,C) such that
P c0 (x2,−A,−C) > ακ2 > 0 > −ακ1 = P
h
0 (x1, A, C),
so that the range of bilaterally profitable prices Rp0(x1, x2) is non-empty. Note that here both parties
are willing to pay a strictly positive amount to the other party for the right to enter the contract.
This completes the proof of part (ii). 
Lemma 6.2 Assume that x1x2 = 0. If the function g is given by (6.4), then following inequality
holds
δ := g(t, y + x1B
l
t, z) + g(t,−y + x2B
b
t ,−z)− x1r
l
tB
l
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t ≤ 0.
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Proof. In view of (6.4), we have
δ = −x1r
l
tB
l
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |z¯
i
t|+ r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 ),
where
δ1 = y + x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(z¯
i
t)
−, δ2 = −y + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(−z¯
i
t)
−.
We claim that
δ ≤ min
{
(rlt − r
b
t )x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(r
l
t − r
i,b
t )|z¯
i
t|, (r
b
t − r
l
t)x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(r
b
t − r
i,b
t )|z¯
i
t |
}
.
Indeed, from rl ≤ rb, we have
rlt(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
≤ min{rlt(δ1 + δ2), r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )}
= min
{
rlt(x1B
l
t + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1|z¯
i
t|), r
b
t (x1B
l
t + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1|z¯
i
t|)
}
.
Thus
δ = −x1r
l
tB
l
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |z¯
i
t|+ r
l
t(δ
+
1 + δ
+
2 )− r
b
t (δ
−
1 + δ
−
2 )
≤ −x1r
l
tB
l
t − x2r
b
tB
b
t −
∑d
i=1r
i,b
t |z¯
i
t|
+min
{
rlt(x1B
l
t + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1|z¯
i
t|), r
b
t (x1B
l
t + x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1|z¯
i
t|)
}
= min
{
(rlt − r
b
t )x2B
b
t +
∑d
i=1(r
l
t − r
i,b
t )|z¯
i
t|, (r
b
t − r
l
t)x1B
l
t +
∑d
i=1(r
b
t − r
i,b
t )|z¯
i
t|
}
.
If x1x2 = 0, then the right-hand side in the above inequality is non-positive. We conclude that
δ ≤ 0. 
